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Pandemic Flu Preparedness in Indiana: Ethical Issues and Recommendations 
 
Executive Summary 
 
The World Health Organization reports that more than 300 human cases of avian 
influenza H5N1 have been confirmed and that nearly 200 of these cases have been fatal.  
With experts warning that an influenza pandemic is overdue and that H5N1 has pandemic 
potential, governments, health departments, healthcare professionals, and many others 
have been working to develop response plans for such a crisis.  Included in these plans 
must not only be strategies to address the technical and scientific difficulties that may 
arise, but also strategies to address the moral dilemmas that inevitably will follow.   
The Indiana State Department of Health contracted with the Indiana University 
Center for Bioethics to provide recommendations on four specific areas of ethical 
concern: 
 
• management of the healthcare workforce; 
• triage and allocation of scarce medical resources; 
• necessary alterations to the standard of care provided by healthcare 
professionals; and 
• the allocation of scarce vaccines and antiviral medications. 
 
Following an extensive literature review and study of approaches to these problems by 
other groups, organizations, and agencies, we summarized the ethical issues in each area, 
and propose 14 total recommendations for action. Recommendations described below are 
shortened in this document; a fuller description of each recommendation is provided in 
the respective Technical Advisory Document. 
 
Management of the Healthcare Workforce. Issues included absenteeism and questions of 
whether potential sanctions for absenteeism are justified; the use of control measures, 
such as isolation and quarantine; and the expectations of non-professional healthcare 
workforce, who do not have the same professional obligations as physicians and nurses. 
Four Recommendations are proposed:   
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1. the State must identify all healthcare workers who are deemed to be 
critically necessary during the pandemic; 
 
2. the State and healthcare organizations should adopt a “high expectations, 
no punishment” approach to absenteeism; 
 
3. the State should set and communicate expectations that healthcare 
institutions have adequate medical supplies and that these institutions ensure these 
supplies be made available to all personnel expected to interact with patients; and  
 
4. the State should encourage healthcare institutions to establish clear 
policies for determining sanctions for noncompliance with expected responsibilities 
that are both fair and responsive to exceptional circumstances. 
 
Triage and Allocation of Scare Resources. Triage and access to healthcare resources raise 
questions of how various patient-specific factors (medical, social, demographic) should 
affect individuals’ priority in times of scarcity.  The key ethical issues involve whether to 
include age or social criteria as considerations when determining who is given access to 
scarce medical resources such as ventilators. Three Recommendations are proposed: 
 
 1.  the State should adopt the New York State Workgroup’s framework for 
ventilator triage , which rejects the consideration of social role and age as triage 
inclusion and exclusion criteria in favor of a system of allocation based solely on 
physiologic prognosis; 
 
2. the State should encourage all acute care facilities to adopt a common 
procedure for addressing how to allocate scarce resources; and  
 
3. the State should require all acute care facilities to adopt a common 
procedure to conduct a daily retrospective review of all triage decisions in order to 
identify flaws in the protocol and to provide accountability. 
 
Altered Standards of Care. The key ethical issues are: the use of alternate care sites, such 
as whether facilities should be acquired via coercion or partnership; methods for 
maintaining adequate staffing; and changes in documentation standards for patient 
admittance and fatality processing.  Five Recommendations are proposed: 
 
 1.  the State should develop a protocol which would take effect for all 
healthcare institutions upon the declaration of a statewide pandemic influenza 
emergency by the Governor; 
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 2. the State should begin immediately to engage leadership of all healthcare 
facilities in discussions about the impact of a statewide protocol for altered 
standards of care, including the selection of alternate care sites;  
 
 3. the State should develop a database of healthcare workers and volunteers 
that can be accessed efficiently to provide surge capacity during the pandemic;  
 
 4. the State should ensure that a comprehensive program is developed and 
implemented to provide all healthcare workers with adequate training and 
information regarding pandemic flu and their anticipated responsibilities; and 
 
 5. the State should establish minimal standards for modified documentation 
procedures which can be implemented efficiently at the time of the pandemic for all 
healthcare institutions, mortuaries, and others. 
 
Vaccine and Antiviral Medication Allocation.  The prioritization of individuals depends 
on the immediate objective of the vaccine and antiviral allocation procedure, whether it is 
to minimize societal disruption or to minimize morbidity and mortality. Two 
Recommendations are proposed:  
 
 1.  the State should adopt a system similar to the California Department of 
Health Services’ and construct a prioritization list based on its implementation; 
 
 2. the State should develop an education module for county health 
departments regarding the criteria by which the prioritization plan is developed, 
and counties should be instructed as to how prioritization decisions will be made. 
 
 
All 14 recommendations are consistent with an ethical framework that we have 
developed entitled  Points to Consider, which contains seven key considerations that we 
believe the Indiana State Department of Health should take into account in the 
development of its pandemic flu policies in order to ensure that any policy changes will 
be morally sound and acceptable to Hoosiers.  These points are: 1) consistency with the 
Mission of ISDH and other healthcare organizations in general; 2) transparency; 3) public 
accountability; 4) responsiveness; 5) proportionality; 6) reciprocity; and 7) uniformity of 
implementation.  
 
-- Eric M. Meslin, Jennifer M. Alyea, Paul R. Helft; August 2007 
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Across the globe governments, health 
departments, institutions, and healthcare 
professionals have been preparing for a 
modern influenza pandemic.  In general, 
these preparations have focused on 
technical issues that may arise, such as 
the assignment of duties and how to 
obtain and stockpile medications 
(University of Toronto Joint Centre for 
Bioethics Pandemic Influenza Working 
Group, 2005).  Technical and scientific 
information, however, is insufficient 
when addressing the moral dilemmas 
that will arise in the event of a pandemic 
(Thompson, Faith, Gibson, & Upshur, 
2006).  For example, how will the State 
allocate scarce resources, approach the 
topic of restricting individual freedom, 
or ensure a policy’s fairness? 
  
Often overlooked is the importance of 
the establishment of ethical guidance 
that may assist in the development and 
implementation of pandemic influenza 
preparation and response plans. To 
address this issue, many efforts have 
been undertaken to develop ethical 
principles, framework, and guidance 
documents designed to assist in the 
development, implementation, and 
evaluation of policies that will be 
regarded as fair and morally acceptable 
by the majority of citizens in the event of 
a crisis (Caddy & Vergez, 2003; Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention 
[CDC], 2007; Kass, 2001; Kotalik, 2005; 
Thompson et al., 2006; University of 
Toronto, 2005).   
 
As in any area of public health policy 
that involves ethical issues and 
community values, making 
determinations about the right course of 
action involves a careful consideration 
of all scientific and medical facts 
coupled with ethical principles and 
values.  On the other hand, no algorithm 
has yet been developed that can 
mechanistically make these decisions 
that have ethics content (Fife, Keener, 
Meslin, Randall, & Schiffmiller, 2004).  
 
This document provides a middle 
approach, called Points to Consider, 
which has been used successfully in 
other areas. While Points to Consider 
documents “are not regulations and do 
not have the force of law” (Nail & 
Aikers, 2002, p. 445), they attempt to 
incorporate current attitudes of 
government and academia (Nail & 
Aikers, 2002) and are typically utilized 
when control and evaluation policies are 
in their initial developmental stages 
(Estrin, 1990).  This function is 
applicable to the current pandemic 
response policies. The Points to 
Consider document is an intuitive 
strategy meant to provide a guide for 
action and is framed as questions, the 
answers to which are not predetermined. 
The “Points” are neither a set of decision 
rules that mechanistically resolve issues 
at stake, nor a set of principles whose 
interpretation can be manipulated by 
various parties to support their particular 
points of view. At the same time, there is 
(and must be) a principled basis for each 
of the “Points” if the document is to be 
(and be perceived to be) of value. 
 
This document contains seven points 
that we believe ISDH should consider in 
the development of its pandemic flu 
policies in order to ensure that any 
policy changes will be morally sound 
and acceptable to Hoosiers. It is 
expected that ISDH will directly refer to 
this document when drafting policy and 
when evaluating the impact of policy. It 
is further expected that any policy 
should be consistent with this document. 
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In this way it functions both as an ethics 
framework and as a method for ethical 
policy construction.  
 
Points to Consider 
 
Consistency of the Mission of the 
Indiana State Department of Health and 
the Professional Values of Healthcare in 
General 
 
It is the mission of the Indiana State 
Department of Health to support 
Indiana's economic prosperity and 
quality of life by promoting, protecting, 
and providing for the health of Hoosiers 
in their communities and to do so via 
intra- and interagency cooperation and 
data-driven policy.  In preparation for an 
influenza pandemic, everyday methods 
of fulfilling this mission and vision will 
need to be carefully reconsidered in 
response to shifting public health 
priorities. The ISDH has a public set of 
values embodied in its Mission and 
Vision Statements. Similarly, health 
professionals—physicians, nurses, social 
workers, technicians, health 
administrators and others—each 
subscribe to a set of professional 
standards, commitments, and ethical 
values inherent in their own respective 
practices.  To the extent possible, 
decisions regarding pandemic influenza 
preparedness must be internally 
consistent with the respective value and 
mission statements of the individual 
groups and jointly consistent across 
groups.   
 
The following questions should be 
addressed: 
 
• What mechanisms will be used to 
provide the Indiana public with the 
assurance that the policy will be 
consistent with the principles, 
missions, and values of ISDH and 
health care professionals generally? 
• What mechanisms are contemplated 
for attending to conflicts that may 
arise when the proposed policy is 
consistent with the values of ISDH 
but not other organizations?  For 
example, what if the policy conflicts 
with the values of a private medical 
center? 
 
Transparency 
 
No policy can be developed, much less 
implemented, without an assurance that 
its justification and rationale have been 
made clear to those who will be affected 
by it.  Maintaining transparency and 
open communication enhances the 
public’s trust in the decision-makers and 
may assist in achieving public 
compliance to control measures 
(University of Toronto, 2005).  
Policymakers’ concern that openness 
may lead to public distress does not 
justify a lack of transparency, “just as a 
concern for a patient’s anxiety would not 
justify not warning him of an impending 
stroke” (Kotalik, 2005, p. 430).   
 
When developing a policy, the following 
transparency questions should be raised: 
 
• What steps are being taken to inform 
the public of the policy and its 
implications? 
• What steps are being taken to inform 
healthcare professionals, staff, and 
administrators of the policy and its 
implementation? 
 
Public Accountability 
 
It must be possible “to identify and hold 
public officials to account for their 
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actions” (Caddy & Vergez, 2003, p. 29) 
in order to avoid an erosion of trust and 
transparency with the public.  In the 
event of a pandemic flu crisis, 
policymakers are obligated to include a 
method for ensuring ethical guidelines 
and procedures are upheld (Thompson et 
al., 2006). Should an error or oversight 
occur, it is the responsibility of the 
policymakers to acknowledge the 
situation and address the public 
promptly in order to resolve the resulting 
complications.  Failure to do so may 
result in a loss of public support and 
compliance.   
 
For this reason, decision-makers should 
be prepared to answer the following 
questions:  
 
• What steps have been taken to 
prepare for a public 
acknowledgement of flaws in the 
policy and/or its implementation that 
may arise as the pandemic 
progresses? 
• Who will take responsibility for such 
flaws or errors while addressing the 
public? 
• What actions will be taken to ensure 
the effects of any errors will be 
corrected and/or minimized? 
 
Responsiveness 
 
While it is often accepted that public 
health actions should ultimately be 
determined by experts, involving the 
public can help build trust and increase 
acceptance of the proposed policy (CDC, 
2007).  Public engagement may occur 
along a spectrum: at one end of the 
spectrum, the public is merely informed 
of the policy.  The most extreme version 
of this is to be informed after the policy 
is in place.  A less extreme version is to 
be informed that the policy is being 
developed.  At the other end of the 
spectrum, the public has the power to 
give or withhold permission for the 
policy to be developed or implemented. 
At this extreme, the public is a “partner” 
in the development of the policy. In the 
middle of this spectrum, the public has 
the opportunity to express views 
(vociferously) about the policy. These 
views may be considered by the public 
health professionals, but there is no 
obligation for them to do so.   
 
Questions regarding the involvement of 
the public and health professionals 
include: 
 
• What outlets are available to the 
public and to health professionals for 
inclusion in policy formation?  Are 
these outlets accessible to 
representatives from all groups of 
stakeholders? 
• What outlets are available to the 
public and to health professionals for 
expression of concern about or 
dissent for the policy?  For example, 
will a website or a call center be 
established to receive this input?  
Dissent alone does not sufficiently 
justify blocking a public health 
program, but if the majority of 
complaints are coming from a 
particular subgroup, corrective 
actions may be required to assuage 
these grievances (Kass, 2001). 
• What steps will be taken to respond 
to the concerns of the public and of 
health professionals?  
 
Proportionality 
 
Policies and procedures should be based 
on sound scientific evidence or on the 
best evidence available (CDC, 2007).  
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An ineffective intervention will not 
achieve the desired outcome, no matter 
how perfectly implemented.  In addition, 
the policy’s measures should reflect the 
severity of the situation while remaining 
as minimally invasive as possible.  “The 
greater the burdens posed by the 
program, the stronger the evidence must 
be to demonstrate that the program will 
achieve its goals” (Kass, 2001, p. 1779).   
 
When determining if a policy’s measures 
are proportional to its need, the 
following questions should be carefully 
considered:  
 
• Do the benefits of the policy 
outweigh the burdens of 
implementing it?  For example, is 
sacrificing individual liberty or 
scarce financial or human resources 
appropriate given the anticipated 
outcome?   
• Could a less restrictive measure 
achieve the desired results? 
• Is any group taking on more burden 
than is necessary to achieve the 
desired outcome (i.e. is subjected to 
improper discrimination)?  In other 
words, is the policy substantively 
fair? 
 
Reciprocity 
 
In the event of a pandemic flu crisis, 
certain communities and individuals may 
face increased risk of illness and/or 
restrictions on their autonomy.  In such 
an event, decision-makers must have a 
developed procedure to minimize the 
resulting encumbrance.  “If leaders 
expect people exposed to or suffering 
from communicable diseases to act in a 
manner that does not put others at risk, it 
is important that they create a social 
environment that does not leave people 
without supports” (University of 
Toronto, 2005, p. 13).   
 
Questions to be considered include: 
 
• What steps are being taken to 
support those individuals who take 
on a necessary but disproportionate 
burden of the disease, such as health 
care professionals or individuals 
subjected to isolation or quarantine?  
For example, are healthcare workers 
being offered lifelong care for any 
disabilities that result from acquiring 
the illness, or are quarantined 
individuals being protected from 
financial burden resulting from work 
absenteeism? 
• Are those citizens without 
immunization being informed of 
other preventive measures available 
to them? 
• Are those citizens who are denied 
access to limited medical supplies 
informed of other options available 
to them? 
 
Uniformity of Implementation 
 
Consistency in the implementation and 
application of the policy helps to ensure 
that similar cases will be treated equally 
(CDC, 2007).  This will aid in 
eliminating unnecessary discrimination 
and may assist in conveying the policy’s 
fairness to the public and to the affected 
parties.   
 
On the topic of uniformity, the following 
questions should be considered: 
 
• What steps are being taken to ensure 
the policy is being implemented 
consistently throughout the state? 
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• How will this consistency of 
implementation be enforced, and by 
whom? 
• What procedures will be in place for 
evaluating policy implementation 
and for proposing revisions to it?  
For example, how will ISDH revise 
procedure if significant new 
epidemiological data arises? 
• What exceptions may be made to the 
policy, and who has the authority to 
make these exceptions?  Under what 
guidelines will this authority 
evaluate the appropriateness of any 
exceptions? 
 
Implementation/Operationalizing the 
Points to Consider 
 
The “Points” in this document should be 
acknowledged explicitly whenever a 
policy is being developed. We intend for 
the individual questions identified within 
each “Point” to be answered and, in so 
doing, provide a justification for the 
extent to which the “Point” is or is not 
being accommodated in policy. 
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With nearly forty years passed since the 
last influenza pandemic, experts are 
warning that the next pandemic is 
overdue and that the H5N1 strain of 
avian influenza has this pandemic 
potential (Ontario Health Plan for an 
Influenza Pandemic [OHPIP], 2006).  
According to the World Health 
Organization (2006), H5N1 “has met all 
prerequisites for the start of a pandemic 
save one: an ability to spread efficiently 
and sustainably among humans” (para. 
18).  As a result of this threat, 
international organizations, 
governments, health departments, 
institutions, and healthcare professionals 
throughout the world are currently 
preparing for a modern influenza 
pandemic.  Such preparations require a 
shift in priorities and expectations in 
medical care delivery and setting.  This 
includes the allocation of “scarce 
equipment, supplies, and personnel in a 
way that saves the largest number of 
lives in contrast to the traditional focus 
on saving individuals” (Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality 
[AHRQ], 2005, p. 8).   
  
A scarcity of resources within the 
context of a severe pandemic emergency 
will inevitably require an alteration in 
healthcare practice.  Indeed, not only 
will practice need to be modified but so 
too might the very norms and 
assumptions underlying provision of 
healthcare.  As such, any 
recommendations for altering the 
standards of care will require careful 
consideration and justification.  This 
document addresses the ethical 
implications of implementing altered 
standards of care.   
 
The Issues 
 
A review of the relevant literature 
(AHRQ, 2005; AHRQ, 2007; Bogdan et 
al., 2004; Cantrill, Eisert, Pons, & Vinci, 
2004; Center for Law and the Public’s 
Health at Georgetown and Johns 
Hopkins Universities, 2001; De Ville, 
2007; Gostin et al., 2002; New York 
State Workgroup on Ventilator 
Allocation in an Influenza Pandemic, 
2007; OHPIP, 2006; Rubinson et al., 
2005; United States Department of 
Health and Human Services [HHS], 
2007a; United States Department of 
Health and Human Services [HHS], 
2007b; World Health Organization, 
2006), found five areas of agreement 
regarding the implementation of altered 
standards of care.   
 
These agreed upon topics are presented 
in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Areas of Agreement Regarding Altered Standards of Care 
Issue Explanation 
Timing of protocol development Planning must be done prior to the event of a pandemic in order 
to ensure the most ethically and operationally sound policies.  
“Actions that are carefully planned, justified, and executed are 
easier to defend retrospectively than those made out of panic or 
confusion” (De Ville, 2007, p. 317). 
 
Communication with the public and 
healthcare providers 
 
It is essential to make the public and healthcare providers 
aware of the need for altered standards of care, as well as the 
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details about the specific alterations.  Messages must be 
consistent, simple, and clear and take into consideration the 
various segments of the population (e.g., non-English 
speakers).  This will help to gain compliance and reduce civil 
unrest. 
 
Management of psychological crises 
 
The public in general and healthcare staff in particular may 
experience emotional and psychological distress due to the 
unique demands that may arise in the event of a public health 
crisis.  Psychological First Aid should be provided in order to 
help alleviate this situation. 
 
Legal protection for providers and 
facilities 
 
Healthcare providers and facilities may face litigation in 
response to decisions which are necessitated by the altered 
standards of care.  Because healthcare facilities, professionals, 
staff, and volunteers may be reluctant to provide care due to 
fear of legal repercussions, alterations to relevant healthcare 
laws and regulations are necessary in the event of an 
emergency in order to ensure the participation of as many 
providers as possible.  Planners must identify in advance any 
applicable laws and regulations, such as those which may be 
altered or suspended during an emergency.  These may include: 
EMTALA, HIPAA, the Federal Volunteer Protection Act, and 
the Good Samaritan Law (AHRQ, 2007). 
 
Security 
 
The combination of the health crisis and the shift in healthcare 
delivery methods potentially may result in civil unrest and 
increased violence, particularly in healthcare facilities.  
Increased and adequate security at each healthcare delivery site 
in order to protect the safety of patients and providers alike is 
necessary. 
 
We note that while there is agreement 
reached on these issues, other ethical 
issues may not enjoy the same level of 
accord, perhaps because the deviation 
from standard healthcare norms affects 
several areas of healthcare delivery.  
Three additional issues arise: 1) the need 
for alternate care sites; 2) adequate 
staffing; and 3) standards of 
documentation.    
 
Alternate Care Sites.  Pandemic flu will 
require planners to consider the need to 
use alternate care sites for healthcare 
delivery, quarantine, and isolation 
should hospitals become overwhelmed 
(AHRQ, 2005; AHRQ, 2007; Bogdan et 
al., 2004; Cantrill, Eisert, Pons, & Vinci, 
2004; Center for Law and the Public’s 
Health at Georgetown and Johns 
Hopkins Universities, 2001; Gostin et 
al., 2002; HHS, 2007a; HHS, 2007b; 
OHPIP, 2006; Rubinson et al., 2005).  In 
addition to the question of which 
facilities to utilize, planners also will be 
expected to consider how they will 
obtain access to and control of these 
facilities (coercion vs. partnership) and 
whether the owners and administrators 
of these facilities will be compensated or 
insured for their assistance. 
 
Adequate Staffing.  A pandemic will lead 
inevitably to staffing losses resulting 
from illness, fear, and conflicting 
obligations (e.g., family needs).  Due to 
the combination of such absenteeism and 
a surge in patients, a shortage of workers 
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is expected (AHRQ, 2005; AHRQ, 
2007; Bogdan et al., 2004; Cantrill et al., 
2004; Center for Law and the Public’s 
Health at Georgetown and Johns 
Hopkins Universities, 2001; De Ville, 
2007; Gostin et al., 2002; HHS, 2007a; 
HHS, 2007b; New York State 
Workgroup on Ventilator Allocation in 
an Influenza Pandemic, 2007; OHPIP, 
2006; Rubinson et al., 2005).  Such 
shortages will require institutions to 
consider how to anticipate and address 
these shortages principally because the 
alteration of staff members’ regular 
responsibilities may result in increased 
stress for the affected staff or in a quality 
of care below that which is present in 
non-pandemic situations.    
 
Standards of Documentation.  In the 
event of an influenza pandemic, current 
documentation standards of healthcare 
facilities for charting, medical records, 
diagnostic procedures, and consent “will 
be impossible to maintain” (AHRQ, 
2005, p. 10).  The consequences of these 
challenges include backlogs of patients 
and of processing fatalities (AHRQ, 
2005; AHRQ, 2007; Gostin et al., 2002), 
which may lead to delayed care and 
delayed burial, potentially offending the 
customs of certain religious groups 
(AHRQ, 2007).  The modification of 
documentation standards, however, may 
result in inadequate or inappropriate care 
and in difficulties obtaining 
reimbursement (AHRQ, 2005). 
 
The Approaches 
 
Using Alternate Care Sites.  Bogdan et 
al. (2004) write that call centers can be 
important resources involved in 
processes including “syndromic 
surveillance, emergency medicine and 
triage, and home health care support” (p. 
34).  The one-on-one communication 
that callers receive may be an important 
source of reassurance and instruction, 
and utilizing such an approach may 
prove to be useful in alleviating hospital 
overflow.   
 
Should hospitals require an expansion of 
their facilities, several possible locations 
have been suggested to handle triage, 
non-critical care, isolation, and 
quarantine, among others.  These include 
adult detention facilities, aircraft 
hangers, churches, military facilities, 
schools, hotels, convalescent care 
facilities, and sports facilities (AHRQ, 
2007; Cantrill et al., 2004; OHPIP, 
2006), provided they are readily 
accessible to the public (e.g., near public 
transportation) (AHRQ, 2007).  Gostin 
et al. (2002) recommend that, if private 
property (e.g., a sports facility) is 
confiscated by the government for use of 
public services such as an acute care site, 
the owner(s) should be compensated.  
They state, however, that if property is 
taken and destroyed because it poses a 
serious health threat, then the owner(s) 
need not be compensated (Gostin et al., 
2002).  Another approach to obtaining 
alternate care sites is through partnership 
and agreement with, instead of the 
outright seizure of, the facilities that 
potentially may be used (OHPIP, 2006).  
Such collaboration should be initiated 
prior to an acute emergency.  The 
OHPIP (2006) document also addresses 
the inclusion of insurance coverage for 
the utilized sites.  Such coverage 
includes that for “fire, damage, theft, and 
site liability” (OHPIP, 2006, p. 11A-6).   
 
Ensuring Adequate Staffing.  Should 
there be a deficiency in the number of 
employees required to sustain normal 
operations and standards, healthcare 
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facilities may supplement staff from 
various sources.  The first source is to 
supplement the workforce from the 
regular hospital staff.  This would 
require an alteration in responsibilities.  
For example, Rubinson et al. (2005) 
state that if hospitals have a shortage of 
intensivists, those in nonintensivist 
positions may instead work with 
critically ill patients under the 
supervision of an intensivist.  The New 
York State Workgroup (2007) also 
includes a discussion of the modification 
of individual responsibilities, stating that 
“less experienced staff may need to 
manage patients” (p. 12), so added duties 
should be simplified to the furthest 
extent possible.   
According to AHRQ (2005), other 
potential staff should be identified prior 
to the pandemic and may include 
“retired or currently unemployed but 
qualified volunteer providers” (p. 27), 
reserve military and nursing providers, 
veterinarians, dentists, and pharmacists.  
In addition, non-medical responders may 
be trained to “support health and medical 
care operations” (AHRQ, 2005, p. 27; 
Rubinson et al., 2005).  Healthcare 
professionals who are not currently 
licensed in the state are another potential 
source, even though their involvement in 
providing care may result in what would 
ordinarily be considered substandard 
care. 
 
Licensing requirements may be 
suspended via gubernatorial orders 
(Cantrill et al., 2004).  In order to ensure 
the ability to call upon these individuals 
in times of staffing needs and to verify 
their credentials and capabilities, AHRQ 
(2005), Cantrill et al. (2004), and 
Rubinson et al. (2005) recommend the 
development of a registry or database of 
these potential replacement staff.  Such a 
database may expedite the process of 
increasing staffing, as well as make 
certain that the called-upon individuals 
are qualified to perform their newly 
assigned duties.  Furthermore, AHRQ 
(2007) recommends the development of 
identification procedures, such as site-
generated photo IDs, for staff members 
in response to the unfamiliarity of the 
staff with each other.  This will help to 
assure patients and employees alike that 
all workers have been credentialed 
and/or verified. 
 
Whether retrieved from existing staff or 
from a group of volunteers, AHRQ 
(2005) states that healthcare workers 
involved in providing care during a 
pandemic should be instructed and 
prepared to the greatest extent possible.  
“Planners should not assume that 
individual providers will know how to 
deliver appropriate care in a mass 
casualty event, but rather should develop 
or identify training programs to ensure a 
knowledgeable and systematic, 
coordinated response effort” (AHRQ, 
2005, p. 28).  Rubinson et al. (2005) 
state that staff should receive training 
regarding the use of personal protective 
equipment, which will assist in workers 
feeling more adequately prepared for 
dealing with the infirmed.  Educating 
healthcare workers with information 
about the etiology of the illness and its 
proper control measures is expected to 
increase willingness to provide care 
(Tzeng, 2004) and also will aid in 
maintaining workers’ safety and health. 
 
Finally, some literature suggests the 
necessity of meeting various needs of the 
staff—regular and volunteer—during the 
crisis in order to help ease the burden of 
the heavy and stressful workload.  These 
needs may involve housing (AHRQ, 
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2007; Center for Law and the Public’s 
Health at Georgetown and Johns 
Hopkins Universities, 2001), 
transportation, child care, and pet care 
(Cantrill et al., 2004).  Additional 
compensation for those working in times 
of a pandemic also has been 
recommended (OHPIP, 2006). 
 
Documentation Alterations.  AHRQ 
(2005) suggests that it is necessary to 
alter current documentation procedures 
in such a way that adequate information 
is gathered regarding patient medical 
needs and means of reimbursement 
“without posing an undue administrative 
burden” (p. 13).  Changes in these 
procedures may result in decreased 
patient privacy and confidentiality, but 
the rights of patients should be preserved 
to the greatest extent possible (AHRQ, 
2005).  Nonetheless, it has been argued 
that citizens must be required to sacrifice 
some of their liberties in order to 
maintain the health and safety of the 
masses (Gostin et al., 2002).   
 
Documentation not only affects patient 
care and reimbursement, it also affects 
mortuary procedures.  A backlog of 
fatality processing may result in delays 
in burial.  Gostin et al. (2002) write that 
“the authorities are required to exercise 
their powers with respect for cultural and 
religious beliefs and practices such as 
observing, wherever possible, religious 
laws regarding burial” (p. 626).  
Similarly, AHRQ (2007) writes that 
procedures for complying with 
individuals’ funeral and burial practices 
should be outlined in advance, while 
remaining flexible to meet the demands 
of the situation.  Religious and cultural 
communities should be informed of any 
such procedures, which should “ensure 
that the minimum level of disruption to 
usual cultural practices and the 
maximum level of dignity are afforded 
the deceased and their families” (AHRQ, 
2007, p. 73).  A major barrier to 
complying with such procedures, 
however, is that the remains may pose a 
threat to the living in the event of a 
pandemic (AHRQ, 2007).  In such an 
event, careful consideration must be 
made to manage the delicate situation. 
 
Recommendations 
 
Recommendation 1: The State of 
Indiana should develop a protocol for 
altered standards of care, which 
would take effect for all healthcare 
institutions upon the declaration of a 
statewide pandemic influenza 
emergency by the Governor.  This 
protocol should specify those 
healthcare professionals affected by 
this protocol and would include legal 
protections for healthcare providers 
and institutions.   
 
It is necessary for any decisions about 
altering the standards of providing 
healthcare to patients in Indiana to be 
statewide and uniform.  As a part of this 
protocol, it is critical for the State to 
identify relevant laws and regulations 
that may need to be altered or suspended 
during an emergency in order to provide 
legal protections to healthcare 
institutions, providers, staff, and 
volunteers.  Doing so may increase 
healthcare workers’ and healthcare 
institutions’ compliance to the 
recommended alterations by removing 
the fear of litigation that may result from 
following altered standards of care.  It 
also may help to ensure these altered 
standards are implemented consistently 
statewide.     
 
Altered Standards 
  19 
Recommendation 2: The State should 
begin immediately to engage 
owners/administrators of all 
healthcare facilities in discussions 
about the impact of a statewide 
protocol for altered standards of care, 
including the selection of alternate 
care sites.  All efforts should be made 
to agree to these changes by consensus 
and partnership. 
 
The key to a smooth transition from 
current to any system that amends the 
standards of care is the emphasis on 
early planning.  The use of partnership 
instead of coercion may result in less 
resistance and greater compliance to the 
use of alternate care facilities.  In 
addition, it is recommended that such 
facilities are insured and compensated to 
the most reasonable extent possible for 
their cooperation so that they do not 
suffer large financial or property losses.  
Finally, selected facilities should be 
located in readily accessible sites to 
ensure ease of access for citizens. 
 
Recommendation 3: The State should 
design, develop, and maintain a 
database of healthcare workers and 
encourage all healthcare institutions, 
including professional schools, to 
identify potential healthcare workers 
and register them into this database 
prior to the pandemic. 
 
Through the creation of a database, 
volunteers such as retired or inactive 
nurses and physicians, as well as 
professionals from other related fields 
(e.g., dentists), could be called upon in 
times of emergency.  A common 
database can be accessed efficiently to 
manage workforce flow. 
 
Recommendation 4: The State should 
ensure that a comprehensive program 
is developed and implemented to 
provide all healthcare workers with 
adequate training and information 
regarding pandemic flu and their 
anticipated responsibilities. 
 
By being prepared, these potential staff 
members are more likely to report to 
work and to provide care of the greatest 
quality possible in the strained situation.  
In addition, it is recommended that these 
workers be provided compensation and 
have their basic needs met (e.g., housing, 
child care) while working under the 
stressful conditions. 
 
Recommendation 5: The State should 
establish minimal standards for 
modified documentation procedures 
which can be implemented efficiently 
at the time of the pandemic for all 
healthcare institutions, mortuaries, 
and other organizations. 
 
This will help to reduce the number of 
backlogged patients and fatalities; to 
provide patients with the most 
appropriate care available given their 
individual needs; to reduce the amount 
of privacy and confidentiality each 
patient must sacrifice; and to ensure 
reimbursement for the healthcare 
facilities.  If at all possible, mortuary 
procedures should allow families to 
carry out their desired funeral and burial 
practices, provided the deceased does 
not pose a significant threat to the health 
of the community.  The possibility of 
mortuary delays and non-adherence to 
religious burial practices should be 
discussed with citizens and faith-based 
communities in advance. 
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Application to the Points to Consider 
 
The aforementioned recommendations, 
in addition to the areas of agreement 
regarding altered standards of care 
mentioned earlier, adhere to several of 
the “Points” stated in the Points to 
Consider document.  These relevant 
Points are presented in Table 2 below.  
 
Table 2: Points to Consider Reflected in the Altered Standards of Care Document 
Ethical Point to Consider Applicability to Recommendations 
Transparency Proving the public and healthcare providers with 
information regarding alterations in regular 
healthcare procedures will help to achieve 
compliance to these procedures.  Discussions with 
citizens and faith-based communities regarding 
potential barriers to adherence to funeral and burial 
procedures will prepare these communities for 
potential delays and alterations that may occur 
while attempting to follow cultural practices.  By 
making these communities aware of these 
implications prior to the event, they may be more 
likely to comply with the necessary course of 
action. 
 
Responsiveness 
 
Through partnership with the owners/administrators 
of potential alternate care sites, planners may 
develop procedures that will ensure the public’s 
health needs are met while assuring owners their 
facilities will be properly insured and protected. 
 
Proportionality 
 
Alternate care sites are to be used only when 
hospitals lack sufficient capacity; alternate staffing 
procedures are to be used only when there is a 
staffing shortage; and documentation procedures are 
to switch to truncated procedures only when current 
standards are impossible to maintain given a large 
patient influx.  Patients must sacrifice some privacy 
and confidentiality only when absolutely necessary 
to maintain a functioning care facility. 
 
Reciprocity 
 
Providing legal protection and mental health 
services to healthcare workers will help to ease the 
disproportional amount of burden they will bear.  
Preparing these workers prior to the pandemic will 
reduce the stress they will endure.  Providing 
additional security also will help to ease the burden 
of healthcare professionals, as they will be more 
able to perform their duties in the absence of fear.  
Furthermore, meeting the basic needs of these 
workers, such as providing housing for non-local 
volunteers, will help to reduce stress and to retain 
these staff members.  Apart from staffing 
reciprocity, the owners/administrators of alternate 
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care site facilities are provided insurance and/or are 
reimbursed for their contributions.   
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The World Health Organization (2007) 
reports that 317 human cases of avian 
influenza H5N1 have been confirmed 
and 191 of these cases have been fatal.  
With experts warning that an influenza 
pandemic is overdue and that H5N1 has 
pandemic potential (Ontario Health Plan 
for an Influenza Pandemic [OHPIP], 
2006), governments, health departments, 
health care professionals, and many 
others have been working to develop 
response plans for such a crisis.  Those 
plans must include ethical strategies for 
allocating resources which become 
insufficient to support the demand, 
because “shortages of specialized staff, 
medical equipment, and supplies could 
limit the number of patients who can 
receive the appropriate supportive 
critical care interventions” (Rubinson et 
al., 2005, p. 6).  Such resource allocation 
strategies may be referred to as “triage” 
of scarce resources because they 
necessarily involve a prioritization of 
which patients will receive care when 
not all can.  Consistent, ethically 
defensible methods for allocating scarce 
resources require careful planning and 
deliberation.  This document presents 
several ethical issues that must be 
considered and addressed in the 
development of a triage protocol for 
Indiana, followed by a set of 
recommendations.  When considering 
the recommendations, it should be noted 
that triage prioritization differs from 
immunization prioritization in the event 
of a pandemic.  The arguments presented 
here refer only to the former.   
 
The Issues 
 
A review of the small but growing 
literature on allocation of scarce 
resources during a pandemic event 
(Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality [AHRQ], 2007; Burkle, 2006; 
Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention [CDC], 2007; Challen, 
Bright, Bentley, & Walter, 2007; Clarian 
Ethics Policy Review Committee 
Working Group on Ethics in Pandemic 
Flu [Clarian], 2006; Christian et al., 
2006; Hick & O’Laughlin, 2006; Indiana 
Pandemic Influenza Community 
Advisory Groups , 2006; Melnychuk & 
Kenny, 2006; New York State 
Workgroup on Ventilator Allocation in 
an Influenza Pandemic, 2007; Ontario 
Health Plan for an Influenza Pandemic 
[OHPIP], 2006; Rubinson et al., 2005) 
suggests several areas of agreement, 
summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Areas of Agreement Regarding Triage 
Issue Explanation 
Timing of protocol 
development 
It is necessary to establish triage guidelines prior to the occurrence of a 
pandemic in order to make the most ethically sound, well-considered choices 
possible. 
 
Triage classification 
personnel 
 
Identification of who will be responsible for making the triage decisions is 
necessary before a pandemic strikes.  Teams or triage officers, such as 
supervising clinicians, are recommended.  Individual physicians should not 
make such decisions unless absolutely necessary in order to avoid conflicting 
senses of duty toward patients and the public and to ensure equitable 
application of triage guidelines. 
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Location of 
implementation 
 
Policies must be implemented statewide and/or regionally in order to ensure 
fairness and equal opportunity for care to all the State’s citizens. 
 
Transparency and public 
awareness 
 
Preparing the community for the challenges embedded in a pandemic event 
will help to reduce civil unrest and may assist with gaining compliance. 
 
Managing psychological 
crises 
 
Clinicians, first-responders, the afflicted and their families, as well as the 
“worried well” may all require Psychological First Aid to treat emotional 
distress, and provisions should be made to make this available to them. 
 
Proportionality in 
implementation 
 
Inclusion and exclusion factors should only be considered when all other 
options have been exhausted.  For example, if canceling or postponing 
elective surgeries will result in a sufficient supply of ventilators, then other 
criteria need not be considered. 
 
Inclusion of patients in 
acute care 
 
Non-influenza patients in acute care facilities also must be included in triage 
in order to maximize the number of lives saved.  This also will help to ensure 
that care and resources are distributed fairly and similarly among all acute 
care patients. 
 
Use of palliative care 
 
Those denied access to ventilators and other medical resources should be 
provided palliative care and pain management. 
 
Flexibility of guidelines 
 
Because current triage protocols have yet to be tried in a real-world situation, 
their effectiveness and potential drawbacks are not entirely known.  In 
addition, technological advances may require a revision of procedure in 
order to accommodate new innovations.  Triage guidelines must be 
adaptable. 
 
Plan for legal protection 
 
Healthcare providers may face litigation for following triage criteria.  
Providing legal protection for those who make allocation decisions using 
established guidelines will increase healthcare worker compliance and 
ensure consistent implementation. 
 
In addition to these issues, the use of 
smart systems for assigning prognosis 
based on acute physiology is a vital 
component of any system of triage.  
Such predictive systems have been 
developed in critical care populations to 
predict the likelihood of a patient’s 
survival to discharge, including 
APACHE III, SAPS, LOD, MODS, and 
MPM II (Hick & O’Laughlin, 2006).  
Variations of the Sequential Organ 
Failure Assessment model—sometimes 
referred to as the Sepsis-related Organ 
Failure Assessment model (New York 
State Workgroup, 2007) or SOFA—
arose most frequently in the literature 
review as the fairest and most effective 
prognostic scoring method (Christian et 
al., 2006; Hick & O’Laughlin, 2006; 
New York State Workgroup, 2007; 
OHPIP, 2006).  SOFA assesses six 
organ systems, “each graded from 0 to 4 
points according to the degree of 
dysfunction” (Arts, de Keizer, Vroom, & 
de Jonge, 2005, p. 1988).  The resulting 
scores can be compared to 
predetermined treatment categories to 
establish a patient’s treatment plan.  For 
example, individuals with a SOFA score 
>11 have more than a 90% mortality rate 
(OHPIP, 2006) and would be unlikely to 
benefit from intensive care treatment.   
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While we found general agreement 
regarding the majority of ethical 
considerations that should affect triage 
planning, other key issues surrounding 
triage allocation decisions remain 
unresolved.  These center primarily on 
disagreement over what non-
physiological considerations should be 
incorporated into inclusion and 
exclusion criteria.  These considerations 
include: role in society (e.g., should 
healthcare workers receive preferential 
treatment within an allocation 
framework?), age (e.g., should younger 
patients receive preferential treatment 
compared to older patients?), and “social 
worth” (e.g., should any other individual 
characteristics influence preferential 
treatment?) 
 
The Approaches 
 
Table 2: Summary of Groups’ Non-physiological Considerations for Triage Criteria 
Source Role in Society Age 
AHRQ (2007) -- -- 
CDC (2007) ? ? 
Challen et al. (2007) ? ? 
Clarian (2006) ? ? 
New York State Workgroup 
(2007) 
-- -- 
OHPIP (2006) -- ? 
? = should be considered; 
-- = not considered 
 
Those Supporting Inclusion of Social 
Role and Age in Triage Criteria.  
According to the CDC (2007), in the 
event of a pandemic, preserving 
society’s function should be given 
priority over maximizing the number of 
lives saved.  Such an argument suggests 
a need for the determination of an 
individual’s “value to societal function” 
and his or her contributions to society.  
The CDC (2007) acknowledges the 
difficulties inherent in this process and 
advocates discussion among diverse 
stakeholders in order to resolve this 
issue, as well as transparency with the 
public in order to increase acceptance 
and compliance.  The Clarian Health 
Partners (2006) working group addresses 
the issue of social role by placing 
healthcare workers, public health 
officials, first emergency responders, 
government officials, and workers 
involved with critical infrastructure in 
positions of priority over others in 
treatment allocation decisions.  Challen 
et al. (2007) also support these 
considerations and write that “social 
factors” (p. 2) should be considered in 
patient categorization.  Their scoring 
system includes a point system that takes 
into account “social isolation… [and a] 
performance status of limited activity or 
worse” (p. 2).  While determining social 
worth is a complex undertaking, at the 
minimum the government workforce can 
be prioritized legally in the event of an 
emergency (AHRQ, 2007).  The 
literature suggests clearly that, in cases 
where priority is given to individuals for 
the sake of preserving societal function, 
  Triage 
 29 
“justification for such decisions should 
be drawn up in advance and publicized” 
(Gomersall et al., 2006, p. 1011).   
 
In addition to social role, the question of 
whether to include age in triage criteria 
has been addressed in several documents 
(AHRQ, 2007; Challen et al., 2007; 
Christian et al., 2006; Clarian, 2006; 
New York State Workgroup, 2007; 
OHPIP, 2006).  The Clarian document 
(2006) suggests that, if all other factors 
are equal, a younger individual should 
be given priority over an older 
individual, because the younger has 
more potential life to lose or gain.  The 
OHPIP (2006) method of addressing 
age, in contrast to Clarian’s (2006), is 
not dependant upon comparisons with 
other patients.  Instead, it uses age as an 
exclusion criterion only if the age of the 
individual is greater than 85 years.  
Challen et al. (2007) suggest that a 
scoring system be used that 
accommodates age, giving the patient an 
extra “point” if he or she is greater than 
or equal to 65 years old.  Other literature 
also suggests considering age in 
exclusion criteria, but methods of how to 
do so are not overtly stated.  Christian et 
al. (2006) write that, although they did 
not include an age criterion in their draft, 
they “received both strong and 
consistent feedback from both expert 
and stakeholder consultations that” an 
age criterion should be included (p. 
1379).   
 
Those Rejecting Inclusion of Social Role 
and Age in Triage Criteria.  The New 
York State Workgroup (2007) offers the 
most extensive discussion on the 
inclusion of priority groups and social 
worth in triage classification procedures, 
and its views are similar to those of the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (2007).  Ultimately, the groups 
reject prioritization using any criteria 
other than medical or physiological 
factors.  The New York State 
Workgroup acknowledges that 
healthcare workers who become ill and 
require acute care will be unlikely to 
recover and return to their duties before 
the pandemic runs its course, making 
their preferential treatment unproductive.  
In addition, the group argues that the 
inclusion of all healthcare workers as 
priority groups—such as morgue 
workers, ambulance staff, firefighters, 
etc.—would result in healthcare workers 
being provided ventilators and other 
medical treatment to the exclusion of all 
other groups in some locales, and 
“ordinary” citizens consistently would 
be denied ventilator access and life-
saving care.  Furthermore, workgroup 
members “objected strongly to the 
appearance of favoritism, in which those 
who devised the rationing system 
appeared to reserve special access for 
themselves” (New York State 
Workgroup, 2007, p. 28).  They suggest 
that the public will hold decision-makers 
accountable for any protocol regarded as 
biased and inequitable, and any 
procedure that may be viewed as 
discriminatory will evoke a harsh 
response from the public at large.  
 
The New York State Workgroup (2007) 
also rejects the use of age as an 
exclusion criterion in their ventilator 
allocation protocol.  The group’s 
argument is based upon the idea that 
aged individuals intrinsically are more 
likely to suffer physiological 
derangement than their younger 
counterparts.  This increased risk will be 
taken into account inherently by the 
SOFA prognostic scoring system used 
by the New York group to determine the 
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individual’s triage status.  Thus, age 
indirectly affects the likelihood of 
survival without being made an 
explicitly decisive factor.  The Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(2007) presents a similar argument, 
stating that “age may be considered only 
as it relates to underlying organ function 
and diagnosis” (p. 71). 
 
Included in the New York State 
Workgroup’s (2007) planning document 
is an acknowledgement of the difficulty 
of the removal of life support.  Because 
such procedures can be traumatic for 
both the patient and the attending 
physician, the New York group 
recommends limiting circumstances that 
would require such actions.  For this 
reason, the group rejects the idea of a 
universal “trial period” for ventilator use 
for incoming patients, as it ultimately 
could result in large numbers of 
extubated patients.  They also have 
reservations about removing a ventilator 
from a patient who is stable or 
improving in favor of a new patient with 
a better prognosis.  Instead, the 
Workgroup suggests evaluation based on 
the SOFA score.  Patients on ventilators 
would be assessed at 48 and 120 hours.  
“Those who meet the criteria for benefit 
or improvement would continue until the 
next assessment, while those who no 
longer met these criteria would lose 
access to mechanical ventilation” (New 
York State Workgroup, 2007, p. 32).  
The patients who are removed from life 
support should be given palliative care 
with the option of sedation.  Justification 
for extubation and sedation should be 
documented.  
 
It should be noted that the New York 
group’s suggested protocol aims to 
prevent the need for the inclusion of a 
“tiebreaker” in the event that two 
patients with identical SOFA scores 
present for medical attention.  It does so 
by recommending the adjustment of 
each day’s threshold SOFA score so that 
a few extra ventilators are always 
available in intensive care units.  For 
example, at times when relatively few 
patients are in need of intubation, the 
SOFA threshold may be high, and 
individuals with high SOFA scores still 
may have access to a ventilator.  When 
many patients are in need of ventilators, 
however, the SOFA threshold must be 
set lower, and those individuals with 
high SOFA scores no longer may be 
allowed access.  While this protocol 
theoretically will eliminate the need for a 
tiebreaker, it remains a possibility that 
individual hospitals may face rare 
instances in which a tie does occur.  
How to address such an occurrence is 
not discussed in the New York 
document.   
 
Terminal extubation of patients in 
chronic care facilities is addressed in the 
New York protocol.  It is the group’s 
recommendation that triage criteria not 
be expanded to include individuals in 
chronic care facilities, as such actions 
would “make victims of the disabled” 
(New York State Workgroup, 2007, p. 
29).  Should an individual from such a 
facility require admittance into an acute 
care facility, however, he or she would 
be subject to the same triage criteria as 
other acute care patients. 
 
The New York State Workgroup (2007) 
also includes an appeals process in their 
triage protocol.  Appeals may be used, 
for example, when a clinician disagrees 
with a patient’s triage classification.  
The group presents two possible 
methods for undertaking such an appeals 
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process.  The first is for a committee to 
review the appeal as it occurs.  This 
could benefit individual cases, but it also 
may delay others from receiving care 
(New York State Workgroup, 2007).  In 
addition, it could spark “explosive 
debate during a time of scarce manpower 
and other resources” (New York State 
Workgroup, 2007, p. 36).  An alternative 
approach would be to have a daily 
retrospective review of all triage 
decisions in order to identify flaws in the 
protocol and to provide accountability.  
In this situation, however, individual 
patient interventions would not be 
possible (New York State Workgroup, 
2007).   
 
Recommendations 
 
Recommendation 1: The Indiana 
State Department of Health should 
adopt the New York State 
Workgroup’s (2007) protocol, which 
rejects the consideration of social role 
and age as triage inclusion and 
exclusion criteria in favor of a system 
of allocation based solely on 
physiologic prognosis. 
 
This protocol is preferred for the 
following reasons: 1) it allows for public 
accountability by using quantitative and 
objective data, which are much more 
easily justified to the general public than 
subjective “social worth” evaluations; 2) 
it facilitates uniformity of 
implementation, because the analysis of 
objective data creates less variation in 
triage decisions than subjective 
considerations would create; and 3) it is 
the only system of all those considered 
which logistically could be implemented 
on a Statewide level.  The New York 
proposal relies on a prognostic scoring 
system based only on readily-available 
physiological criteria.  Scores can be 
calculated easily for all individuals 
presenting for consideration, and 
allocation decisions can be made 
centrally, based on the number of 
resources available at the time (e.g., 
ventilators or ICU beds) and the number 
of individuals above and below a 
threshold score for that time.  Threshold 
scores can be adjusted based on 
availability of resources.  
 
The adoption of a system similar to the 
proposal developed by the New York 
State Workgroup’s would, of necessity, 
require centralized allocation decision-
making.  This would include collecting 
real-time information about patients at 
risk, their SOFA scores, and resources 
available, and setting thresholds for 
triage up to several times per day.  Such 
a centralized decision-making process 
would take individuals on the ground out 
of the decisions and allow them merely 
to implement decisions made at the State 
level.   
 
Recommendation 2: The Indiana 
State Department of Health should 
encourage all acute care facilities to 
adopt a common procedure for 
addressing how to allocate scarce 
resources when two (or more) patients 
arrive at an acute care facility with 
identical prognoses, and there are 
insufficient resources to treat all. 
 
We acknowledge the ethically sensitive 
nature of any tiebreaking criterion.  
Although this protocol is expected to be 
used only in rare circumstances, it is 
necessary for institutions to have in 
place a common policy for addressing 
these issues.  For example, the policy 
must not take into account factors that 
have already been included in the 
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original triage plan and must provide an 
equal opportunity for treatment amongst 
the afflicted.  In such a rare event that a 
tiebreaker must be used, we recommend 
that concept of “first come, first served” 
be applied, with “time arrived” being 
defined as the time the individual’s 
SOFA score is entered into the system.  
This will reduce the need to extubate 
those patients who already have begun 
intensive care treatment, thus reducing 
further psychological trauma for those 
patients, their families, and their 
physicians.  “First come, first served” 
also is an objective deciding factor, as 
opposed to the evaluation of social role.   
 
Recommendation 3: The State should 
require all acute care facilities to 
adopt a common procedure to conduct 
a daily retrospective review of all 
triage decisions in order to identify 
flaws in the protocol and to provide 
accountability. 
 
Since an appeals process would be likely 
to interfere substantially with the system 
of resource allocation, we instead would 
recommend daily review of decisions by 
the central triage officials, with 
prospective, system-wide resolution of 
discrepancies which become apparent. 
 
Application to the Points to Consider 
 
Such a triage framework would be 
consistent with several of the ethical 
“Points” presented in the Points to 
Consider document.  Table 3 below 
summarizes the applicable “Points” and 
how they are addressed.   
 
Table 3: Points to Consider Reflected in the Proposed Triage Protocol 
Ethical Point to Consider Applicability to Protocol 
Transparency The protocol proposes that the State educate the 
public about the developing triage guidelines.  
Efforts to include historically underserved 
populations are recommended.  Ethical justification 
for triage criteria is enumerated. 
 
Public Accountability 
 
Objective decision-making procedures eliminate 
subjectivity and bias from the triage protocol.  As a 
result, allocation decisions will be able to withstand 
public scrutiny. 
 
Responsiveness 
 
The inclusion of an appeals process allows 
healthcare workers and the general public to voice 
concern and dissent.  Evaluation of these appeals 
will result in more effective and acceptable triage 
protocol. 
 
Proportionality 
 
Less drastic methods of preserving scarce resources, 
such as canceling elective surgeries, are 
recommended prior to the implementation of 
rationing procedures.  As need becomes greater and 
resources become more scarce, the policy’s 
inclusion and exclusion criteria become more 
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restrictive, reflecting the level of severity of the 
situation.   
 
Reciprocity 
 
The protocol provides various means of support to 
affected individuals.  For example, those individuals 
denied access to scarce resources (e.g., ventilators) 
are provided other means of medical attention, such 
as palliative care, and those with emotional and 
psychological burdens resulting from the crisis (e.g., 
healthcare workers) are provided Psychological 
First Aid.   
 
Uniformity of Implementation 
 
The analysis of objective physiological data creates 
less variation in triage decisions than subjective 
considerations would create. 
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The pandemic potential of the H5N1 
strain of avian influenza has created the 
necessity for comprehensive planning of 
resources and procedures.  Although 
H5N1 has not yet acquired efficient 
transmission between humans, evidence 
suggests that soon this may be possible, 
causing widespread transmission (World 
Health Organization [WHO], 2006).  
Various experts have projected that this 
strain of avian influenza has the potential 
to be comparable to the 1918 pandemic, 
causing approximately 180–360 million 
deaths globally, and with 1.7 million 
deaths possible in the United States 
alone (Barnett et al., 2005).  As a result, 
the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), the U. S. Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS), 
and other governmental agencies have 
established pandemic preparedness as a 
top priority.  Included in those plans 
must be strategies for allocating vaccine 
and antiviral resources which will 
become insufficient to support the 
demand.  A consistent, equitable, and 
well-developed method for the 
prioritization of target groups for 
vaccination and antiviral therapy 
requires detailed consideration.  
Presented in this document are several 
issues to be deliberated and addressed in 
the development of such allocation 
priorities.  This discussion is followed 
by recommendations for the Indiana 
State Department of Health.     
 
The Issues 
 
A review of the developing literature on 
vaccine and antiviral agent prioritization 
(Barnett et al., 2005; California 
Department of Health Services [CDHS], 
2006a; California Department of Health 
Services [CDHS], 2006b; California 
Department of Health Services [CDHS], 
2006c; California Department of Health 
Services [CDHS], 2006d; Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 
Ethics Subcommittee of the Advisory 
Committee to the Director, 2007; Florida 
Department of Health [Florida DOH], 
2004; Gostin, 2006a; Gostin, 2006b; 
Gostin & Berkman, 2007; HHS, 2005; 
HHS, 2006; New York State Department 
of Health [NYSDOH], 2006; Olson, 
Simonsen, Edelson, & Morse, 2005; 
Public Engagement Pilot Project on 
Pandemic Influenza [PEPPPI], 2005) 
identifies four areas of agreement.   
 
These are presented in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1:  
Areas of Agreement Regarding Vaccination and Antiviral Agent Prioritization 
Issue Explanation 
Planning It is necessary to establish target group prioritization guidelines prior to the 
occurrence of a pandemic in order to prepare for the inevitable shortages of 
vaccines and antiviral agents. 
 
Implementation 
 
Policies must be implemented consistently to ensure fairness and equal 
opportunity for care. 
 
Transparency and public 
awareness 
 
Preparing and informing the community regarding how target groups are 
intended to be prioritized during a pandemic event will help to reduce civil 
unrest and may assist with gaining compliance. 
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Flexibility of guidelines 
 
The epidemiology of the actual influenza pandemic may vary from what is 
projected.  Plans must be modifiable to ensure the most appropriate response 
and usage of vaccines and antiviral agents.  Changes in the production 
volume of vaccine manufacture also may affect prioritization.  Technological 
advances in vaccine production and other innovations may require a revision 
of procedures.  Prioritization guidelines must be able to accommodate 
changes that result from these factors. 
 
Providing vaccines and antiviral 
medications will be a principal strategy 
in the response to an H5N1 pandemic, 
and a majority of the proposed 
expenditures in the federal influenza 
plan are devoted to these 
countermeasures (Gostin, 2006a).  
Within the $6.7 billion federal plan, $4.7 
billion has been allotted for vaccine 
stockpiling and technology development, 
and $1.4 billion has been allotted for 
antiviral agents (Gostin, 2006a; Gostin 
& Berkman, 2007).  Allocation of these 
federal stockpiles has been 
predetermined based on State population 
(HHS, 2006).  However, in the event of 
a pandemic, there almost certainly will 
be an insufficient supply of vaccines and 
antiviral medications, and particular 
target groups will need to be prioritized 
(Gostin & Berkman, 2007).  While there 
is general concurrence with the priority 
groups emphasized and the majority of 
ethical considerations which should 
affect vaccine and antiviral allocation 
planning, specific approaches stemming 
from these considerations vary. 
 
The Approaches 
Establishing guidelines for vaccine and 
antiviral distribution requires the 
identification of clear goals and 
objectives, since allocation procedures 
and criteria will be affected directly 
depending on the standards used for 
ranking the various risk groups.  For 
example, although healthcare workers 
consistently are given high priority in the 
various protocols (CDHS, 2006b; 
Florida DOH, 2004; NYSDOH, 2006), 
utility workers are not always identified 
as a high priority group (CDHS, 2006d).   
 
The two primary areas of concern that 
are debated in terms of their relative 
importance are the reduction of societal 
disruption and the minimization of 
morbidity and mortality.  Societal 
disruption can be described as a 
significant disturbance to the functioning 
of society (e.g., the cessation of essential 
services or the occurrence of severe 
economic distress), and some argue that 
reducing societal disruption should be 
given priority over the minimization of 
morbidity and mortality (CDC, 2007; 
PEPPPI, 2005).  By adopting this as the 
top priority, individuals who are 
prioritized may include those involved in 
public safety and maintaining order, 
those who are key government leaders 
and decision-makers, and those involved 
in “maintaining homeland security, 
utilities, food distribution, and 
communications” (PEPPPI, 2005, p. 19).   
 
Others contend that minimizing 
morbidity and mortality should be the 
main objective in vaccine and antiviral 
prioritization strategies (CDHS, 2006b; 
Florida DOH, 2004; HHS, 2005).  This 
strategy is partially dependent upon 
epidemiological data (CDHS, 2006d), 
which will help to identify the groups 
that are at the highest risk.  For example, 
it is noteworthy that the pandemic could 
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affect young adults disproportionately, 
as occurred with the 1918 strain (Olson 
et al., 2005).  This characteristic may 
create the need to favor this age group 
over others in the effort not only to save 
the most lives (Gostin & Berkman, 
2007), but to save lives that have the 
best chance of living into adulthood to 
maintain societal functioning.  In 
addition, efforts to save the most lives 
will include the prioritization of medical 
personnel, who not only treat the 
afflicted but who also come into contact 
with large numbers of individuals, both 
with the flu and without.  Healthcare 
providers’ vaccination would allow 
medical care to continue and would slow 
the transmission of the virus throughout 
the population by preventing 
transmission from the provider to 
uninfected patients.   
 
The debate regarding which objective 
(and therefore which groups) to 
prioritize has occurred at the federal and 
state levels.  According to the CDC 
(2007), in the event of a pandemic, 
preserving society’s function should be 
given priority over maximizing the 
number of lives saved.  As a result, these 
CDC guidelines identify those who are 
“essential to the provision of health care, 
public safety and the functioning of key 
aspects of society” (CDC, 2007, p. 2) as 
the groups that should have priority in 
the distribution of vaccines and 
antivirals.  The CDC (2007) states that 
this approach uses a “social worth 
criterion and its use is justified in these 
limited circumstances” (p. 7).  However, 
the CDC does not state explicitly who 
would be considered essential and 
recommends policymakers engage in a 
dialogue with all stakeholders to make 
this determination. 
 
For the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan 
(2005), the Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices and the National 
Vaccine Advisory Committee provide 
general recommendations regarding the 
allocation of vaccines and antiviral 
medications.  However, conversely to 
the CDC guidelines, these advisory 
committees consider the primary goal of 
a pandemic response to be decreasing 
the health impact on society and 
secondarily rank the minimizing of other 
societal and economic impacts.   
 
States also have varied in the way they 
have included these goals in their efforts 
to develop specific guidelines and 
prioritizations.  In addition to these 
federal recommendations, the vaccine 
and antiviral agent prioritization 
guidelines of California, Florida, and 
New York have been reviewed.   
 
California.  The California guidelines 
consider the minimization of health 
consequences as the primary objective in 
the response to a pandemic, under the 
assumption that “focusing intervention 
efforts on reducing the direct health 
consequences [such as death] reduces 
indirect consequences (e.g., economic 
loss and social disruption)” (CDHS, 
2006c, p. 15).  The minimization of 
social disruption and economic loss also 
are identified as critical factors, 
however, and as a result, strategies 
presented are required to achieve all 
three of these goals.  The CDHS 
strategies additionally are evaluated 
based on their ethical, legal, political, 
and implementation feasibility.   
 
Four rationing strategies are identified as 
meeting these standards for 
prioritization: allocation to those who 
perform essential emergency response 
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roles; allocation based on identification 
of medical and prevention needs in order 
to limit risk of transmission, infection, 
and complication; allocation based on 
the probability of successful 
immunization; and allocation to those 
who perform critical infrastructure 
services (CDHS, 2006a).  The target 
groups presented in the California 
guidelines were developed by University 
of California, Berkeley, Center for 
Infectious Disease Preparedness 
researchers and vetted by representatives 
from the CDHS Joint Advisory 
Committee on Pandemic Influenza 
Vaccine and Antiviral Prioritization, in 
addition to staff within the CDHS 
Immunization Branch.   
 
The CDHS also has developed the 
Decision Analysis Scoring Tool (DAST) 
as a resource to analyze “multiple goals, 
criteria, and alternatives to develop an 
optimal prioritization scheme” (CDHS, 
2006b, p. 14).  This tool takes into 
account various criteria, such as risk of 
infection, risk of transmission, and role 
in direct emergency response service.  It 
was distributed to several groups so that 
they could rank, on a scale of 0 to 10, 
various populations on each of the 
predetermined criteria.  For all identified 
populations, CDHS has calculated the 
average scores for each criteria category, 
and the sums of these averages are the 
basis for the priority rankings.  This 
mathematical method allows for clear 
identification of priority groups.  Should 
epidemiological data become available 
that identifies some groups at greater 
risk for infection or transmission than 
previously assumed, DAST scores and 
rankings then may be adjusted 
accordingly.  Such elements of the 
California guidelines enable them to be 
comprehensive, yet they remain flexible 
to the potential modifications necessary 
in the event of a pandemic.  Currently, 
essential medical and emergency 
response personnel retain the highest 
rankings in the priority list, and the 
healthy adult population that otherwise 
does not hold essential positions is 
ranked at the bottom (CDHS, 2006b). 
 
Florida.  As with the California 
guidelines, those developed by the 
Florida Department of Health identify 
the minimization of illness and death as 
its primary goal and the minimization of 
social disruption as secondary (Florida 
DOH, 2004).  The need for the protocol 
to be flexible in order to accommodate 
epidemiological data is emphasized 
additionally within the guidelines.  The 
guidelines for both the Florida DOH and 
CDHS similarly define the primary goals 
for the prioritization of vaccines and 
antiviral medications.  The Florida 
guidelines rank healthcare workers, 
those responsible for law enforcement, 
and those with specialized skills 
essential for utility services all as having 
priority over those at high risk for illness 
and mortality (Florida DOH, 2004).  The 
CDHS guidelines include “both 
epidemiologic as well as social role-
oriented criteria” (CDHS, 2006a, p. 
123), and medical care and emergency 
response personnel comprise the top 
third of the priority list (CDHS, 2006b).  
A difference between the two sets of 
guidelines is that CDHS (2006d) ranks 
those in the utility industries in the 
bottom third of the priority list due to 
these workers having low projected risks 
of hospitalization and death, limited 
projected infectiousness and contact with 
susceptible populations, and minimal 
risk of contact with infected populations. 
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New York.  The New York State 
Department of Health identifies its 
primary objectives to be limiting illness 
and death as well as social interruption 
(NYSDOH, 2006).  These guidelines 
differ from the others, however, in that 
these two priorities are not ranked in 
terms of relative importance to each 
other.  As with the California guidelines, 
New York recommends that groups 
considered to be at medical risk be given 
higher priority over those involved with 
infrastructure roles.  The importance of 
continuously reassessing the established 
priorities based on epidemiological 
information additionally is given focus.  
The NYSDOH explicitly identifies those 
healthcare workers with direct patient 
contact as a primary target group, just as 
the CDHS guidelines recommend.  The 
NYSDOH and CDHS guidelines also are 
similar in terms of their ranking and 
rationale for other specific priority 
groups.  However, the CDHS guidelines 
are more explicit in their approach of 
categorization methodology, such as the 
use of the Decision Analysis Scoring 
Tool (DAST) to assess prioritizations.  
The CDHS guidelines additionally 
emphasize the need for strategies to 
fulfill multiple criteria for their inclusion 
in the response plan. 
 
Recommendations 
 
Recommendation 1: The Indiana 
State Department of Health should 
adopt a system similar to the 
California Department of Health 
Services vaccine and antiviral agent 
prioritization plans and construct a 
prioritization list based on its 
implementation.   
 
This protocol places the maximization of 
lives saved as the top priority to be 
achieved.  By making the first 
prioritization the reduction of direct 
health consequences, the reduction of 
indirect consequences such as societal 
and economic disruption also will result.  
In order to achieve these objectives, the 
plan assesses multiple criteria, including 
individuals’ risk of infection and risk of 
transmission.  Therefore, those at highest 
risk for these outcomes will be given 
higher priority ranking.  Those with 
roles in emergency response also are 
given higher rankings, both due to their 
high risks of infection and transmission, 
as well as their abilities to maximize 
others’ chances of survival.  Those given 
lower priority in the California system 
are less likely to become infected and 
transmit the virus, thus have a lesser 
need for vaccines and antivirals. 
 
The California scoring method takes into 
account a variety of criteria in the 
structuring of its prioritization rankings, 
including those related to the 
minimization of deaths, of societal 
disruption, and of economic disruption.  
Although the scale used to evaluate the 
criteria for each identified population is 
subjective, the calculation method for 
scoring and ranking these groups is 
objective and consistently implemented 
through the use of the Decision Analysis 
Scoring Tool methodology.  The use of 
such a mathematical scoring method 
based on a variety of criteria, rather than 
simple subjective rankings, allows for 
greater transparency and accountability 
to the public, as well as the consistent 
implementation of vaccination protocol.  
Furthermore, the use of DAST allows 
for flexibility and adjustment should 
new epidemiologic data arise.  It also 
may be distributed and calculated in 
Indiana to adapt the prioritizations to the 
State’s unique needs.   
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Recommendation 2: The Indiana 
State Department of Health should 
develop an education module for 
county health departments regarding 
the criteria by which the prioritization 
plan is developed, and counties should 
be instructed as to how prioritization 
decisions will be made. 
In times of scarcity, a common approach 
to allocation is essential.  Each county 
should be confident that it fully 
understands the objectives of ISDH with 
respect to prioritizing vaccine and 
antiviral availability.  Therefore, each 
county should be briefed fully as to how 
ranking will occur, and each should be 
asked to undertake a census of their 
respective counties to determine 
eligibility. 
 
Application to the Points to Consider 
 
The areas of agreement presented in 
Table 1 and the recommended vaccine 
and antiviral agent prioritization 
guidelines are consistent with several of 
the ethical “Points” presented in the 
Points to Consider document.   
 
Table 2 below summarizes the 
applicable “Points” and how they are 
addressed.   
 
Table 2: Points to Consider Reflected in the Proposed Prioritization Strategy 
Ethical Point to Consider Applicability to Protocol 
Transparency The inclusion of open communication facilitates public awareness of 
the prioritization policies and their implications. 
 
Public Accountability 
 
The inclusion of the public in the various levels of the policymaking 
process, as well as the inclusion of means of communication to the 
public, allows policymakers to address the public promptly regarding 
any complications of the guidelines. 
 
Responsiveness 
 
Public and professional input contributed in the decision-making 
process, as well as the presence of communication mechanisms, allow 
for the iterative evaluation and improvement of the prioritization 
guidelines. 
 
Reciprocity 
 
Healthcare workers engaged in direct patient care and emergency 
response personnel will be at highest risk of infection and are 
prioritized for protective equipment, vaccines, and medications to 
minimize their increased risk of infection and allow them to fulfill 
their duties.  
 
Uniformity of Implementation 
 
Development of vaccine and antiviral agent prioritization groups at 
the State level via the use of DAST allows for clear and consistent 
identification of priority groups. 
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Serious outbreaks of avian influenza A 
(H5N1) have occurred among birds in 
Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.  
Although highly contagious among bird 
populations, the H5N1 virus is rare in 
human populations due to a significant 
species barrier (World Health 
Organization [WHO], 2006).  However, 
as of June 29, 2007, human infection has 
continued to increase with 317 reported 
cases, 191 of which were fatal (WHO, 
2007a).  While there has been no 
efficient human-to-human transmission 
to date (WHO, 2006), the underlying 
knowledge of the virus—its highly 
virulent nature, constant evolution and 
mutation, and the potential for 
transmission from migratory birds to 
mammals and humans—has raised 
global concern of a pandemic potential. 
 
The World Health Association and the 
World Health Organization have 
recognized the potential of an influenza 
pandemic and have called for member 
nations to start planning for the next 
pandemic (WHO, 2005), which WHO 
refers to as “‘inevitable, and possibly 
imminent’” (Barnett et al., 2005, p. 
1235).  Some professionals have 
suggested preparing for a pandemic 
similar to the 1918 “Spanish flu” that is 
estimated to have caused 50–100 million 
deaths.  It is projected that a similar 
pandemic would cause about 180–360 
million deaths globally, including 1.7 
million deaths in the United States, with 
transmission of the disease lasting at 
least two years (Barnett et al., 2005). 
 
If such a pandemic occurs, it will require 
drastic, though temporary, changes in 
many areas of society, including 
hospitals, schools, workplaces, and other 
public service organizations.  In 
planning a response for such a 
pandemic, many decisions will have to 
be made both to contain and control its 
spread, and policies to guide decision-
making will require consideration of 
ethical issues related to workforce 
management, allocation of scarce 
resources, and minimization of societal 
disruption. 
 
This paper discusses the ethical concerns 
related to workforce management.  By 
“workforce” we mean all persons 
employed in the various occupational 
fields.  As such, this paper identifies 
workforce-related ethical issues and 
suggests relevant questions that 
policymakers should take into account 
when planning for an influenza 
pandemic response.  Finally, it provides 
recommendations to the Indiana State 
Department of Health that may be used 
in the planning process. 
 
It is necessary to note that although an 
influenza pandemic would affect the 
workforce indiscriminately throughout 
society, we will focus primarily on the 
healthcare sector and the healthcare 
workers in clinical environments such as 
hospitals and clinics.  We also briefly 
will consider other workers, such as food 
service and janitorial workers, in those 
same institutions.  This focus is 
intentional given the direct impact on the 
delivery of health care to patients should 
these essential healthcare workers be 
unavailable to carry out their 
responsibilities.  Nevertheless, it is 
paramount to note the presence of 
workforce that support continual 
operation of healthcare delivery (e.g., 
suppliers of drugs and devices). 
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The Issues 
 
A review of current literature on 
workforce management (Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality 
[AHRQ], 2005; AHRQ, 2007; Barnett et 
al., 2005; Ehrenstein, Hanses, & 
Salzberger, 2006; Gomersall et al., 2006; 
Gostin, 2006; Hsin & Macer, 2004; Lo 
& Katz, 2005; Morin, Higginson, & 
Goodrich, 2006; Reid, 2005; Tzeng, 
2004; University of Maryland Center for 
Health and Homeland Security, 2005; 
WHO, 2005) suggests some areas of 
agreement.   
 
These are summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Areas of Agreement Regarding Workforce Management 
Issue Explanation 
Planning It is crucial to plan for a response strategy to a 
pandemic prior to its occurrence. 
 
Involvement in policymaking 
 
It is necessary to include both the public and 
healthcare workers in the planning process in order 
to gain support for and compliance to the plan.  
Public and worker involvement also will help to 
cultivate ethically sound decision-making.  
 
Prioritization 
 
Healthcare workers should be given priority to 
scarce protective resources, such as protective 
equipment, vaccines, and prophylactic antiviral 
medications. 
 
We note that the agreement reached on 
these three issues is not surprising, since 
they are somewhat uncontroversial.  
Other ethical issues may not enjoy the 
same level of agreement.  Therefore, we 
outline the following four additional 
issues: the duty to care in healthcare 
provision; sanctions for absenteeism; 
control measures; and obligations of 
other important individuals in the 
workforce. 
 
Duty to Care.  Healthcare workers and 
healthcare professionals are faced with 
the risk of being infected while 
providing care to both infected and 
exposed patients.  The level of risk is 
relative to the specific agent involved in 
the pandemic, which in most cases will 
be unknown, at least when the first cases 
are identified.  Since most healthcare 
professionals are bound by a code of 
ethics that obligates them to provide care 
to patients, the scenario above gives rise 
to several ethical concerns: what degree 
of risk is acceptable in occupational 
exposure?  Should the obligation to 
provide care diminish with rising levels 
of risk?  Is there a level of risk at which 
the duty to care no longer remains (Reid, 
2005)?  Should we expect healthcare 
workers to sacrifice their lives for our 
society in severe pandemics because it is 
ethically unacceptable for them to 
abandon patients (Hsin & Macer, 2004)?  
How should healthcare workers balance 
competing obligations when they come 
into conflict, such as when obligations to 
family conflict with obligations to 
patients (Hsin & Macer, 2004)?  Is the 
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obligation to treat absolute (Morin et al., 
2006)?  Each of these questions speaks 
to the central ethical concern facing 
healthcare workers in a pandemic: the 
nature and extent of their obligation to 
care for patients, even when this creates 
a risk of harm to the healthcare workers 
themselves. 
 
Sanctions for Absenteeism.  The public 
will demand that healthcare 
professionals be held accountable for 
providing care throughout the pandemic.  
However, enforcing accountability raises 
several ethical questions.  For example, 
should care providers be reprimanded 
for choosing not to treat infected patients 
in a severe pandemic, and should 
healthcare workers be reprimanded for 
choosing not to report to work (Hsin & 
Macer, 2004)?  Are there cases when 
absenteeism is acceptable, such as when 
a worker tends to an ill family member?  
What if a worker fraudulently claims to 
be tending to a family member when no 
such family member exists?  Some of 
the possible sanctions for noncompliance 
with one’s employment contract or 
professional duties to care include 
professional licensure revocation (Center 
for Law and the Public’s Health at 
Georgetown and Johns Hopkins 
Universities, 2001) and imprisonment 
(AHRQ, 2007; University of Maryland 
Center for Health and Homeland 
Security, 2005).  Other forms of 
sanctions may include warnings; letters 
of reprimand, financial penalties, or 
license suspension (see for examples, 
Indiana Code 25-1-9-9); or termination 
of employment.  Noncompliance with 
professional ethical obligations to care 
for patients always raises profound 
ethical issues in the normal course of 
affairs.  When extraordinary events 
arise, they sometimes demand 
extraordinary responses, and caution 
must be exercised in how institutions 
respond. 
 
Control Measures.  The State will be 
required to institute public health control 
measures immediately in order to 
contain the spread of the disease.  Some 
of the control measures may include 
quarantining workers in places believed 
to be exposed, such as hospitals, clinics, 
airports, and bus terminals.  These issues 
arose in the SARS epidemic, where 
quarantine was invoked in various 
workplaces (Hsin & Macer, 2004), and 
in the recent case of the airline passenger 
initially diagnosed with extremely 
resistant tuberculosis who was placed in 
isolation upon his return to the United 
States (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention [CDC], 2007a; Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2007b).  
The principal ethical question is whether 
quarantine should be ordered without 
warning or preparation, and whether 
families of care providers should be 
quarantined after a documented exposure 
(Hsin & Macer, 2004). 
 
On the other hand, negative outcomes 
from quarantine, such as fear, 
depression, anxiety, anger, frustration, 
community isolation, and stigma for 
workers providing care to infected 
individuals produce another set of 
ethical concerns: whether families of 
care providers should be prioritized for 
scarce protective resources; whether 
stigmatization of healthcare workers is 
justifiable in pandemic situations; 
whether healthcare workers should be 
quarantined; and whether control 
measures should aim primarily at 
controlling the spread of a disease or at 
reducing societal disruption (Hsin & 
Macer, 2004; Reid, 2005). 
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Other Vital Workers.  For healthcare 
institutions to be able to provide care to 
infected and exposed individuals during 
a pandemic emergency, other vital 
workers need to be at work.  These 
include cooks, hospital janitorial staff, 
and suppliers of critical resources, who 
are hourly employees but who are 
critical to the daily operation of 
healthcare organizations.  In the absence 
of the use of accrued paid sick leave or 
invocation of Family and Medical Leave 
Act (FMLA) rights, a choice not to 
report to work, for whatever reason, 
would result in these workers not being 
paid.  Thus, the main ethical concerns 
revolve around reporting to work: should 
such groups of hospital workers, who do 
not have the same kinds of professional 
obligations that doctors and nurses do, 
be expected to work?  What should the 
consequences be when such workers do 
not report to work?  Will the 
consequences differ depending on the 
underlying reason for absence (e.g., not 
reporting to work due to fear versus 
staying home to care for a sick family 
member)? 
 
The Approaches 
 
A number of approaches have been 
offered to address the ethical issues that 
arise for workers during an influenza 
pandemic.  We outline these below.   
Emphasizing Duty to Care.  As 
emphasized, healthcare professionals 
have a duty to assure adequate 
availability of care in emergencies, and 
various studies have demonstrated that 
most healthcare professionals recognize 
their professional obligation to treat 
patients in an influenza pandemic 
(Ehrenstein, Hanses, & Salzberger, 
2006; Morin et al., 2006).  It also has 
been proposed that educating healthcare 
workers with information about the 
etiology of the illness and its proper 
control measures would increase 
willingness to provide care (Tzeng, 
2004).   
 
The debates that arose about healthcare 
workers’ obligations to assume risk 
during the early years of the HIV/AIDS 
era provide a useful comparison to the 
issues in pandemic flu planning.  In the 
context of treating HIV/AIDS, some 
commentators argued that the obligation 
to provide care to infected patients 
should be inversely related to risk 
(Morin et al., 2006).  The main ethical 
concern was whether there exists a point 
where risk outweighed the obligation to 
provide care.  However, the recent 
experience in the context of SARS 
suggested that risk and obligation do not 
stand in an inverse relationship (Reid, 
2005); rather, it is suggested that the 
greater the risk, the more obligated 
health professionals are to respond.  This 
is based on the argument that there is no 
one else in our society who is “more 
appropriately trained and more deeply 
obligated to serve in [the] case of a 
medical emergency” (Reid, 2005, p. 
352) than healthcare professionals.  If 
they do not tend to the infirmed, who 
will (Reid, 2005)?  Nonetheless, even 
though healthcare professionals appear 
ready to take risk in care provision, other 
healthcare workers, such as health 
administrators, have been reported not to 
have the same commitment (Ehrenstein 
et al., 2006). 
 
Absenteeism.  While some argue that the 
choice of whether to report or not to 
report to work during an influenza 
pandemic should be an individual 
decision, others contend that the decision 
Workforce Management 
  52 
should not be left to individuals (Morin 
et al., 2006).  Nonetheless, from the 
revelation that healthcare professionals 
are dependable in times of crisis as 
depicted during the SARS epidemic, 
there has been growing consensus that 
the choice to report to work by 
healthcare workers should be voluntary 
(Ehrenstein et al., 2006; Hsin & Macer, 
2004). 
 
Since absenteeism is a real possibility, 
planning for countermeasures in case of 
understaffing is recommended.  Some 
have proposed the identification of 
volunteers, such as retired physicians 
and veterinarians, prior to the pandemic 
(AHRQ, 2005; Cantrill et al., 2004; 
Rubinson et al., 2005).  These 
individuals could then be registered in a 
database for their quick retrieval and 
verification (Cantrill et al., 2004; 
Rubinson et al., 2005).  Gomersall 
(2006) suggests drafting of staff to work 
in intensive care units if there are 
insufficient volunteers.  However, he 
cautions that this should be done before 
the pandemic in a manner that is “fair, 
transparent, participatory, [and] 
understood” (Gomersall, 2006, p. 1009).   
 
As with the duty to care, approaches to 
sanctions for absenteeism and refusal to 
care vary greatly.  Regarding penalties 
for those choosing not to report to work, 
Ehrenstein’s (2006) survey found that 
most healthcare professionals did not 
support sanctions for absenteeism.  At 
the opposite end of the spectrum, 
Maryland law requires healthcare 
professionals to report to work in times 
of medical emergencies (University of 
Maryland Center for Health and 
Homeland Security, 2005).  One’s 
failure to do so may result in the 
individual’s arrest (AHRQ, 2007).  Also 
suggested as a form of penalty, the 
Center for Law and the Public’s Health 
at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins 
Universities (2001) discusses the 
possibility of making a practitioner’s 
license dependent upon that individual 
assisting “in the performance of 
vaccination, treatment, examination, or 
testing of any individual” (p. 33).  The 
Public Engagement Pilot Project on 
Pandemic Influenza [PEPPPI] (2005) 
suggests obtaining “commitments from 
vaccinated individuals stating that they 
will conduct the work for which they 
received the immunization” (p. 21).  
Sanctions, then, may be reserved for 
those who break these commitments. 
 
There are substantial difficulties in 
assessing whether the reasons are 
legitimate for absenteeism among 
healthcare professionals.  What is a 
legitimate reason for not reporting to 
work?  Family obligations?  
Overwhelming fear of infection?  How 
can the system verify the reasons 
provided?  Will there be “verification 
officials” to check on healthcare 
professionals and to verify the excuses 
they provide for absenteeism?  
Admittedly, these are delicate decisions 
and require care and consideration. 
 
Control Measures. As control measures, 
isolation and quarantine of exposed 
individuals “are extreme measures that 
require rigorous safeguards” (Gostin, 
2006, p. 1703), especially in pandemics, 
which are known to be socially divisive, 
so that they are exercised fairly and not 
as subterfuges for discrimination 
(Gostin, 2006).  Isolation and quarantine 
may be ineffective because most 
healthcare workers not only dislike 
being quarantined, but they also are 
more likely to fulfill their obligations 
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during a pandemic in the absence of 
strict prophylactic quarantine (Tzeng, 
2004).  On the other hand, as Lo and 
Katz (2005) have argued, the need to 
protect the general public from serious 
illness is more important than respecting 
the individual’s autonomy.  Nonetheless, 
it is argued that this “loss of individual 
liberty must be balanced by the 
demonstrable need for restrictive 
measures to protect society” (Gomersall, 
2006, p. 1010).   
 
This need to protect society has come to 
the forefront recently with the case of 
Andrew Speaker, the individual initially 
diagnosed with extremely resistant TB 
(Conant & Wingert, 2007; WHO, 
2007b).  Few would disagree that 
Speaker’s quarantine was necessary to 
protect the public against the risk of 
possible transmission.  Indeed, the 
outcry has been quite the opposite: had 
the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention put the patient in isolation 
immediately, he would not have exposed 
fellow airline passengers and others to 
this potentially lethal illness.  His forced 
isolation upon return to the United States 
has prevented further possible 
transmission to other members of 
society. 
 
Actions Regarding Other Vital 
Workforce.  Only two organizations have 
commented directly on the issue of 
whether all or only “vital” healthcare 
workers should be subject to workforce 
management strategies.  The AHRQ 
(2005) recommends including protection 
of all staff and their families (e.g., 
providing prophylaxis) in order to ensure 
the staff report to work.  In addition, it 
has been suggested that staff be given 
“opportunities for rest and recuperation” 
(WHO, 2005, p. 40) between waves and 
at the end of the pandemic in order to 
decrease worker burnout. 
 
Recommendations 
 
Recommendation 1: The State 
Department of Health should identify 
and designate healthcare workers 
deemed to be critically necessary 
during a pandemic.   
 
This recommendation is central to all 
workforce policy recommendations, and 
as such needs to be made centrally by 
the State.  A common list that can be 
adapted by institutions for their own use 
will ensure that all workers know their 
status and what will be expected of 
them. 
 
Recommendation 2: The State of 
Indiana and healthcare organizations 
should plan an influenza response on 
the premise of high expectations for 
workplace continuity for professional 
healthcare staff.  Efforts should be 
made to educate fully all healthcare 
workers about the nature of pandemic 
influenza and of their professional 
ethical responsibilities.   
 
It has been observed that healthcare 
workers generally are willing to fulfill 
their obligations in pandemic situations.  
Because verifying reasons for 
absenteeism would be practically 
impossible, we favor a “high 
expectations, no punishment” approach.  
By adopting a policy of high 
expectations, most healthcare workers 
will be encouraged to participate 
voluntarily in the response of a 
pandemic, thereby winning their 
commitment and compliance.  In 
addition, efforts should be made to 
involve all stakeholders to the extent 
Workforce Management 
  54 
possible at various levels of the planning 
process before, during, and after the 
pandemic.  It is critically important that 
healthcare workers be sufficiently 
informed about the nature of pandemic 
flu, its causes, modes of transmission, 
and risk.  Members of a fully informed 
workforce are less likely to make 
inappropriate judgments about their 
personal safety.  
 
Recommendation 3: The State should 
set and communicate expectations that 
healthcare institutions have adequate 
supplies of appropriate medical 
equipment, prophylaxis, and related 
material and that these institutions 
ensure these supplies be made readily 
available to all critical personnel 
expected to interact with patients.  
Healthcare institutions should be 
expected to inform the relevant county 
and State health officials of the extent 
to which they are able to meet these 
expectations. 
 
Since healthcare workers will be 
expected to care for patients thereby 
placing their own lives at risk, this 
recommendation recognizes that there is 
a commensurate obligation on the part of 
the healthcare institution to provide as 
safe a work environment as possible for 
those workers who will be placing 
themselves at increased risk.  Since 
healthcare coordination in a pandemic is 
a statewide responsibility, it is 
incumbent on the State to ensure that 
institutions carry out these functions.  
Identified critical personnel should be 
given priority to scarce protective 
resources, such as protective equipment, 
vaccines, and prophylactic antiviral 
medications.  They must have adequate 
protection in order to protect the health 
and safety of the general public.  
However, the limitations and eligibility 
criteria need to be outlined clearly in 
advance.  Finally, due to workers’ 
tendency to resist isolation and 
quarantine control measures, these 
measures should be undertaken only if 
alternative approaches (i.e., voluntary 
isolation and quarantine) fail. 
 
Recommendation 4: The State should 
encourage healthcare institutions to 
establish clear policies for determining 
sanctions for noncompliance with 
expected responsibilities that are both 
fair and responsive to exceptional 
circumstances.  By “clear policies” we 
mean that an institution should 
describe whether some or all workers 
may be permitted to be absent; 
whether workers may use accrued 
leave/vacation time; and whether 
sanctions will be applied to workers 
who elect to be absent without 
acceptable reasons. 
 
The rationale of this recommendation is 
based on the historical and accepted 
ethical principles underlying healthcare 
professionals’ obligations to society and 
to patients, as well as the empirical 
observation that most healthcare workers 
have demonstrated readiness to fulfill 
their obligations in pandemic situations 
if they are in agreement with the policies 
adopted.  Listing “reasonable” and 
“unreasonable” justifications for missing 
work, as well as the practical 
impossibility of verifying reasons 
provided, causes us to favor a system 
which sets expectations for participation 
in the care of sick people high, and 
sanctions and other punishments low. 
 
Allowance of some absences but not 
others may prove to be problematic 
because of the difficulties involved in 
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verifying the legitimacy of absentees’ 
excuses.  However, it is recognized that 
in exceptional cases, e.g., a critical care 
nurse who is responsible for her own 
child at home, absence from work may 
be justifiable.   
 
 
 
 
 
Application to the Points to Consider 
 
The recommended workforce protocol is 
consistent with several of the ethical 
“Points” presented in the Points to 
Consider document.   
 
Table 2 below summarizes the 
applicable “Points” and how they are 
addressed. 
 
 
Table 2: Points to Consider Reflected in the Proposed Protocol 
Ethical Point to Consider Applicability to Protocol 
Consistency of the Mission of 
ISDH and Other Healthcare 
Professionals 
The recommendation to involve healthcare professionals in the 
planning process will help to ensure that the protocol is supported by 
the various Missions of the affected organizations. 
 
Transparency 
 
The inclusion of stakeholders in the decision-making process, as well 
as the presence of communication mechanisms, ensures that those 
affected will be informed of the developing protocol. 
 
Public Accountability 
 
The inclusion of healthcare workers in the various levels of the 
policymaking process, as well as the presence of communication 
mechanisms, allows policymakers to address the workers promptly 
regarding any complications of the protocol. 
 
Responsiveness 
 
Healthcare professionals’ input contributed in the decision-making 
process, in addition to the presence of communication mechanisms 
that allow for the expression of dissatisfaction by the healthcare 
professionals, allows for the iterative evaluation and improvement of 
the policy. 
 
Proportionality 
 
As personal risk increases, healthcare workers are able to weigh their 
own priorities to determine whether they will report to work.  They 
are to decide if the benefits of reporting to work outweigh the burdens 
of doing so. 
 
Reciprocity 
 
Healthcare workers, who bear a large portion of the burden of caring 
for the afflicted, are prioritized for protective equipment and 
medications in order to minimize their increased risk of infection.  
 
Uniformity of Implementation 
 
Development of workforce management protocol at the State level, 
the inclusion of healthcare professionals in the development process, 
and open communication will help to ensure members of the 
healthcare field statewide will be aware of and approve of the 
recommended protocol, resulting in policy compliance.  
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With nearly forty years passed since the 
last influenza pandemic, experts are 
warning that the next pandemic is 
overdue and that the H5N1 strain of 
avian influenza has this pandemic 
potential.  According to the World 
Health Organization, H5N1 “has met all 
prerequisites for the start of a pandemic 
save one: an ability to spread efficiently 
and sustainably among humans.”  As a 
result of this threat, international 
organizations, governments, health 
departments, institutions, and healthcare 
professionals throughout the world are 
currently preparing for a modern 
influenza pandemic.  Such preparations 
require a shift in priorities and 
expectations in medical care delivery 
and setting.  This includes the allocation 
of “scarce equipment, supplies, and 
personnel in a way that saves the largest 
number of lives in contrast to the 
traditional focus on saving individuals.” 
 
Several references for this document 
were found via the Indiana University 
Center for Bioethics website’s pandemic 
resources page 
(http://bioethics.iupui.edu/Pandemic.html).  
Others were found through searches on 
the PubMed database 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez/), 
the World Health Organization’s website 
(http://www.who.int/en/), the United States 
Department of Health and Human 
Services website 
(http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan), the 
Ovid Web Gateway 
(http://gateway.ovid.com), and the Yahoo! 
search engine using the terms “pandemic 
influenza,” “pandemic triage,” “avian 
influenza,” “triage,” “pandemic altered 
standards,” “pandemic alternate care 
sites,” “pandemic ventilator allocation,” 
and “pandemic law.”   
 
This document is not exhaustive of all 
possible resources regarding the topic of 
pandemic altered standards of care, but it 
is our hope that these resources may be 
of some use to those who are interested 
in pursuing the topic further.  This 
document is current as of July 16, 2007. 
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The World Health Organization reports 
that 317 human cases of avian influenza 
H5N1 have been confirmed and 191 of 
these cases have been fatal.  With 
experts warning that an influenza 
pandemic is overdue and that H5N1 has 
pandemic potential, governments, health 
departments, health care professionals, 
and many others have been working to 
develop response plans for such a crisis.  
Those plans must include ethical 
strategies for allocating resources which 
become insufficient to support the 
demand, because “shortages of 
specialized staff, medical equipment, 
and supplies could limit the number of 
patients who can receive the appropriate 
supportive critical care interventions.”  
Such resource allocation strategies may 
be referred to as “triage” of scarce 
resources because they necessarily 
involve a prioritization of which patients 
will receive care when not all can.  
Consistent, ethically defensible methods 
for allocating scarce resources require 
careful planning and deliberation.   
Several references for this document 
were found via the Indiana University 
Center for Bioethics website’s pandemic 
resources page 
(http://bioethics.iupui.edu/Pandemic.html).  
Others were found through searches on 
the PubMed database 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez/) 
and on the World Health Organization’s 
website (http://www.who.int/en/) using the 
terms “pandemic influenza,” “pandemic 
triage,” “avian influenza,” “triage,” 
“pandemic ventilator allocation,” and 
“SOFA.”  Finally, the Clarian document 
and the Indiana Pandemic Influenza 
Community Advisory Group document 
were obtained from each group directly.  
 
This document is not exhaustive of all 
possible resources regarding the topic of 
pandemic influenza triage, but it is our 
hope that these resources may be of 
some use to those who are interested in 
pursuing the topic further.  This 
document is current as of July 16, 2007.
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  exclusion criterion, but the authors write that they had consistent feedback that  
  indicated age should be considered in triage. 
 
Clarian Ethics Policy Review Committee Working Group on Ethics in Pandemic 
Flu. (2006).  Pandemic influenza triage principles. Unpublished policy draft. 
  This policy draft addressing triage was developed by an interdisciplinary team,  
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  Indiana University-Purdue University-Indianapolis.  The group’s goals were to  
  develop methods that would maximize healthful life and contribute to ethically- 
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  This document allows for the use of age and social role as exclusionary criteria. 
 
Gomersall, C. D., Tai, D. Y. H., Loo, S., Derrick, J. L., Goh, M. S., Buckley, T. A., et  
al. (2006).  Expanding ICU facilities in an epidemic: recommendations based 
on experience from the SARS epidemic in Hong Kong and Singapore.  
Intensive Care Medicine, 32, 1004-1013. 
  The authors of this document present the recommendations of expert groups who  
  expanded intensive care services in response to outbreaks of severe acute  
  respiratory syndrome in Hong Kong and Singapore.  These recommendations  
  address estimating bed requirements, infection control, staffing, counseling and  
  stress reduction, communication, and other ethical issues.  In regards to triage,  
  the authors recommend that any groups selected for prioritization be identified  
  clearly in advance and that the decision to prioritize a group should be    
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  transparent and justifiable. 
 
Hick, J. L., & O’Laughlin, D. T. (2006).  Concept of operations for triage of  
mechanical ventilation in an epidemic.  Academic Emergency Medicine, 13(2), 
223-229. 
  Hick and O’Laughlin’s report provides a three-tiered approach to the triage of  
  mechanical ventilation in the event of a pandemic situation that causes a scarcity  
  of resources.  With each successive tier, inclusion criteria become more  
  stringent.  The authors write that a patient may be removed from ventilation if a  
  new patient arrives with a better prognosis.  Age is suggested as a possible  
  exclusionary criterion only in the third and most stringent tier. 
 
Indiana Pandemic Influenza Community Advisory Groups. (2006, November 15).   
Report to the state health commissioner on the findings and recommendations 
of the pandemic influenza community advisory groups.   
  This report outlines the pandemic influenza response recommendations provided  
  to the State of Indiana by four separate community advisory groups: the  
  Community Advisory Group on the Role of Antiviral Medications in Pandemic  
  Influenza; the Community Advisory Group on Community Containment  
  Measures: Isolation, Quarantine and Social Distancing; the Community  
  Advisory Group on Altered Standards of Care; and the Community Advisory  
  Group on Mental Health Issues.   It provides each group’s justifications for its  
  recommendations.  Included in discussion of the Community Advisory Group on  
  Mental Health Issues is the group’s support for the use of the Psychological First  
  Aid Model used by the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and  
  Humanitarian Assistance in order to assist individuals suffering from  
  psychological and emotional distress during the crisis. 
 
Melnychuk, R. M., & Kenny, N. P. (2006).  Pandemic triage: The ethical challenge. 
Canadian Medical Association Journal, 175(11), 1393-1394. 
  Melnychuk and Kenny provide a commentary on the triage recommendations  
  put forth by Christian et al. (2006) and the Pandemic Working Group at the  
  University of Toronto’s Joint Centre for Bioethics (2005).  The authors argue  
  that such publications that attempt to address ethical approaches to triage must  
  elaborate on the underlying ethical principles that lead to their conclusions.  The  
  authors regard the concepts of equity of outcomes and fairness as vital in triage  
  implementation, such as the provision of palliative care and pain management to  
  those individuals who are denied other intensive care treatment. 
 
New York State Workgroup on Ventilator Allocation in an Influenza Pandemic.  
(2007, March 15).  Allocation of ventilators in an influenza pandemic: 
planning document.  Retrieved March 17, 2007, from 
http://www.health.state.ny.us/diseases/communicable/influenza/pandemic/ve
ntilators/docs/ventilator_guidance.pdf. 
  The New York State Workgroup has developed a comprehensive plan to address   
  the issue of triage management, specifically ventilator allocation.  This protocol  
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  attempts to provide the most ethically sound method of triage possible and uses  
  only physiological data assessed as a SOFA score in determining ventilator  
  access, thereby eliminating subjective “quality of life” and “social role”  
  decision-making criteria, as well as rejecting the use of age as an exclusionary  
  criterion.  This document is proposed to be the guiding document for the Indiana  
  State Department of Health’s pandemic influenza triage plan. 
 
Ontario Health Plan for an Influenza Pandemic (2006, September). [Electronic  
version].  Retrieved March 28, 2007, from 
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/providers/program/emu/pan_flu/ohpip2/
plan_full.pdf. 
  This document is intended to be the guiding plan for health and response efforts  
  for the Canadian province of Ontario in the event of an influenza pandemic.  It  
  includes information on necessary public health measures that must be taken, as  
  well as a detailed plan on how to maximize communication efforts.  OHPIP also  
  provides a thorough protocol for the implementation of triage.  The  
  physiological assessment is based on the SOFA scoring method, which also is  
  proposed to be the assessment method of healthcare facilities in the State of  
  Indiana.   
 
Rubinson, L., Nuzzo, J. B., Talmor, D. S., O’Toole, T., Kramer, B. R., Inglesby, T.  
V., et al.  (2005).  Augmentation of hospital critical care capacity after 
bioterrorist attacks or epidemics: Recommendations of the working group on 
emergency mass critical care [Electronic Version].  Critical Care Medicine, 
33(10).  Retrieved from Ovid Web Gateway on March 27, 2007.   
  The authors of this document have addressed possible mass critical care  
  alterations that should be made in the event of a bioterrorist attack but also have  
  written that such alterations also may apply to naturally-occurring biological  
  events, such as a pandemic.  In the document, Rubinson et al. discuss triage  
  implementation, the need for altered workforce responsibilities, and possible  
  legislative actions to protect healthcare workers and facilities from litigation.  In  
  this protocol, triage decisions are based on the objective of maximizing the  
  number of lives saved.   
 
World Health Organization. (2007, June 29).  Cumulative number of confirmed  
human cases of avian influenza A/(H5N1) reported to WHO.  Retrieved July  
6, 2007, from  
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2007_04
_02/en/index.html. 
  This website is maintained by the World Health Organization and reports the  
  most current numbers relating to cases of H5N1 in the world.  It currently lists  
  12 countries as having reported cases, 11 of which also have reported deaths. 
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The pandemic potential of the H5N1 
strain of avian influenza has created the 
necessity for comprehensive planning of 
resources and procedures.  Although 
H5N1 has not yet acquired efficient 
transmission between humans, evidence 
suggests that soon this may be possible, 
causing widespread transmission.  
Various experts have projected that this 
strain of avian influenza has the potential 
to be comparable to the 1918 pandemic, 
causing approximately 180–360 million 
deaths globally, with 1.7 million deaths 
possible in the United States alone.  As a 
result, the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC), the U. S. 
Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), and other governmental 
agencies have established pandemic 
preparedness as a top priority.  Included 
in those plans must be strategies for 
allocating vaccine and antiviral 
resources which will become insufficient 
to support the demand.  A consistent, 
equitable, and well-developed method 
for the prioritization of target groups for 
vaccination and antiviral therapy 
requires detailed consideration.   
Several references for this document 
were found via the Indiana University 
Center for Bioethics website’s pandemic 
resources page 
(http://bioethics.iupui.edu/Pandemic.html).  
Others were found through searches on 
the PubMed database 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez/), 
the World Health Organization’s website 
(http://www.who.int/en/), the United States 
Department of Health and Human 
Services website 
(http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan), the 
Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention website (http://www.cdc.gov), 
and the Yahoo! search engine using the 
terms “pandemic influenza,” “pandemic 
triage,” “avian influenza,” “pandemic 
vaccine allocation,” “pandemic law,” 
and “state influenza plans.”  
 
This document is not exhaustive of all 
possible resources regarding the topic of 
pandemic influenza vaccine and antiviral 
medication allocation, but it is our hope 
that these resources may be of some use 
to those who are interested in pursuing 
the topic further.  This document is 
current as of July 16, 2007. 
  
 
  Vaccine Annotated Bibliography  
 72 
References 
 
Barnett, D. J., Balicer, R. D., Lucey, D. R., Everly, G. S., Jr., Omer, S. B., Steinhoff, 
M. C., et al. (2005, December). A systematic analytic approach to pandemic 
influenza preparedness planning [Electronic version]. PLoS Medicine, 2(12), 
1235-1241.  Retrieved May 15, 2007, from 
http://medicine.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-
document&doi=10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0020359. 
  This document provides an overview of the pathology of H5N1 and of its  
              pandemic potential.  In addition, it discusses human, agent, environmental, and  
              sociocultural factors that may influence the spread of the disease.  The authors  
              identify a need for phase-specific planning, relating to the time prior to the  
              pandemic, during the pandemic, and after the pandemic. 
 
California Department of Health Services.  (2006a, September 8).  Pandemic  
influenza preparedness and response plan.  Retrieved May 16, 2007, from 
http://www.dhs.ca.gov/ps/dcdc/izgroup/pdf/pandemic.pdf.  
  CDHS has prepared a pandemic influenza response plan that outlines how it will  
  coordinate the pandemic preparedness, response, and recovery efforts with    
  various federal, county, local, and private partners.  The authors discuss relevant  
  legal references, in addition to surveillance and epidemiology, healthcare  
  planning and infection control, risk communication, community disease control  
  and prevention, and vaccine and antiviral allocation, among other topics.  In   
  reference to vaccine and antiviral allocation, CDHS has identified the  
  minimization of morbidity and mortality as the primary priority to be addressed,  
  with the minimization of societal and economic disruption following as  
  priorities. 
 
California Department of Health Services.  (2006b, January 18).  Pandemic  
influenza preparedness and response plan, Appendix 6: Pandemic influenza 
vaccine program. Retrieved May 16, 2007, from: 
http://www.idready.org/pandemic_influenza/CDHS_plan_appendix6A.pdf.  
  This CDHS document provides an in-depth discussion on the department’s  
  decision-making process regarding how to prioritize groups for vaccine  
  allocation.  Ultimately CDHS opted to use the Decision Analysis Scoring Tool  
  (DAST), which analyzes multiple goals and criteria in the prioritization process.   
  The tool was used based on the primary priority of minimizing morbidity and  
  mortality under the assumption that societal and economic consequences will  
  then be lessened indirectly.  This is the prioritization method that is  
  recommended for the Indiana State Department of Health. 
 
California Department of Health Services.  (2006c).  Vaccine prioritization plan  
supplemental document B: Target population group profiles.  Retrieved May 
16, 2007, from: 
http://www.idready.org/pandemic_influenza/SUPPLEMENTAL_DOC_B.pd
f. 
  Vaccine Annotated Bibliography  
 73 
  This document describes the 69 target population groups that CDHS ranked in  
  terms of vaccine prioritization.  This includes subgroups of five general  
  categories: individuals with specific health-related characteristics; individuals  
  with professions in certain health industries; individuals with roles in public  
  administration, safety, and justice; individuals with professions in non-health  
  commercial industries; and other healthy populations.  These target groups and  
  their subgroups are prioritized in other CDHS documents (see, for example,  
  CDHS, 2006d). 
 
California Department of Health Services.  (2006d).  Vaccine prioritization plan  
supplemental document E: Analysis of DAST survey results.  Retrieved June 
13, 2007, from 
http://idready.org/pandemic_influenza/SUPPLEMENTAL_DOC_E.pdf. 
  This supplemental document provides the Decision Analysis Scoring Tool  
  survey results for the CDHS plan.  It presents the vaccine prioritization rankings  
  for each of the 69 previously identified target groups.  At the top of the list are  
  healthcare professionals who have a high risk of both contracting and    
  transmitting the virus.  At the bottom of the prioritization list are healthy  
  children and adults.  These rankings are based on the top priority of vaccine   
  allocation being the minimization of morbidity and mortality. 
 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Ethics Subcommittee of the Advisory  
Committee to the Director. (2007, February 15). Ethical guidelines in 
pandemic influenza.  Retrieved March 15, 2007, from 
http://www.cdc.gov/od/science/phec/panFlu_Ethic_Guidelines.pdf.  
  This document provides guidance in ethical decision-making related to vaccine  
  and antiviral medication distribution (pharmaceutical interventions) and to social  
  distancing and limiting individual freedom (non-pharmaceutical interventions).   
  It discusses general ethical considerations, such as public involvement and  
  transparency, as well as recommendations for the allocation of scarce resources  
  during a pandemic.  It identifies the need to maintain a functioning society as the    
  primary priority to be addressed regarding vaccine and antiviral allocation. 
 
Florida Department of Health.  (2004, March).   Action plan for pandemic influenza. 
Retrieved May 17, 2007, from:  
http://www.doh.state.fl.us/disease%5Fctrl/epi/htopics/flu/Pandemicdraft8.pd
f.  
  The Florida DOH has prepared this document to assist in pandemic emergency  
  planning and response at all levels of government.  Among others, it discusses  
  surveillance, communication, and antiviral allocation.  Its prioritization for  
  immunizations and antiviral medication is based on the main priority being the  
  minimization of morbidity and mortality, with the minimization of societal and  
  infrastructure disruption ranked as the second priority.  The Florida guidelines  
  rank healthcare workers, those responsible for law enforcement, and those with  
  specialized skills essential for utility services all as having priority over those at  
  high risk for illness and mortality. 
  Vaccine Annotated Bibliography  
 74 
 
Gostin, L. O. (2006a). Medical countermeasures for pandemic influenza: Ethics and  
the law. Journal of the American Medical Association, 295(5), 554-556. 
  Gostin discusses the inevitable shortage of vaccines and antiviral medications  
  that will occur during an influenza pandemic.  He discusses various criteria that  
  can be taken into consideration in order to determine prioritization for medical  
  countermeasure allocation.  These include measures that impede virus    
  transmission; that preserve scientific and social functioning; that address medical  
  need and vulnerability; and that promote equitable access and social justice.   
  Gostin identifies the maximization of lives saved and the preservation of societal  
  functioning as priorities. 
 
Gostin, L. O. (2006b).  Public health strategies for pandemic influenza: Ethics and 
the law.  Journal of the American Medical Association, 285(14), 1700-1704. 
    Gostin suggests a multidimensional approach to addressing the problems that  
               may arise with a pandemic influenza event.  This approach includes  
               surveillance, community hygiene, hospital infection control, social distancing,  
               travel and border controls, and isolation and quarantine.  Regarding vaccines   
               and antiviral agents, Gostin identifies the public benefits to the use of such   
               medical countermeasures, as well as the private interests and rights that would    
               be affected by them. 
 
Gostin, L. O., & Berkman, B. E. (2007).  Pandemic influenza: Ethics, law, and the  
public’s health.  Administrative Law Review, 59(1), 121-176. 
  Gostin and Berkman discuss in detail the allocation of scarce vaccines and  
  antiviral medications, as well as potential ethical and human rights concerns,  
  which may occur during an influenza pandemic.  In addition, the authors identify  
  and address various legal considerations that are applicable to each of these areas  
  of discussion.  They argue for thoughtful reflection on not only scientific  
  responses but also on ethical responses.  In terms of vaccine and antiviral  
  allocation, the authors identify eight rationing criteria they believe should be  
  considered.   
 
New York State Department of Health. (2006, February 7). Pandemic influenza  
plan.  Retrieved May 17, 2007, from  
http://www.health.state.ny.us/diseases/communicable/influenza/pandemic/do
cs/pandemic_influenza_plan.pdf. 
  The purpose of this document is to provide guidance, consistent with national  
  advisories, to public health officials and healthcare providers in their  
  development of pandemic influenza preparedness and response plans.  Included  
  in the document is discussion on surveillance, infection control, vaccine and  
  antiviral allocation, communication, and workforce management, among others.   
  Relating to vaccines and antivirals, NYSDOH bases its prioritizations on the  
  minimization of morbidity and mortality and the minimization of social  
  disruption, but it does not rank explicitly one priority over the other.   NYSDOH  
  does, however, recommend that groups considered to be at medical risk be given  
  Vaccine Annotated Bibliography  
 75 
  higher priority over those involved with infrastructure roles. 
 
Olson, D. R., Simonsen, L., Edelson, P. J., & Morse, S.S.  (2005).  Epidemiological  
evidence of an early wave of the 1918 influenza pandemic in New York City. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of  
America, 102(31), 11059-11063. 
  Olson et al. describe the occurrence of an influenza epidemic in New York City  
  in early 1918.  They argue that its epidemiology suggests it was an early wave of  
  the Spanish flu, preceding the rise of the epidemic in Europe that occurred that  
  summer.  This analysis of a historical case of pandemic influenza provides  
  statistics and epidemiological data that may be relevant to a future H5N1  
  pandemic. 
 
Public Engagement Pilot Project on Pandemic Influenza.  (2005, December).   
Citizen voices on pandemic flu choices.  Retrieved March 13, 2007, from:  
http://pandemicflu.gov/plan/federal/pepppimaintext.pdf. 
  This publication documents public sessions that were held in Washington, D. C.,  
              Georgia, Oregon, Nebraska, and Massachusetts in order to assess stakeholders'  
              and the general public's opinions on pandemic flu vaccination prioritization.   
              The authors state that those involved believed that prioritization first should be  
              based on assuring the functioning of society.  Minimizing deaths and  
  hospitalizations was identified as the second priority.   
 
United States Department of Health and Human Services. (2006, October).  
Antivirals – state allocation.  Retrieved May 16, 2007 from: 
http://pandemicflu.gov/plan/states/antivirals.html. 
   This website shows the allocation of federally- and state-purchased antiviral  
  medications by state, which is based on population.  Indiana is allotted  
  approximately 1.5 million courses.   
 
United States Department of Health and Human Services. (2005, November).  HHS  
pandemic influenza plan.  Retrieved May 15, 2007, from: 
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/HHSPandemicInfluenzaPlan.pdf.  
  The purpose of this HHS document is to serve as a framework for all HHS  
  pandemic response plans.  It outlines federal plans and provides guidance to  
  state and local planners.  The top priority in vaccine and antiviral allocation  
     identified in this document is the minimization of morbidity and mortality.    
 
World Health Organization.  (2006).  Avian influenza ("bird flu”)—Fact sheet.  
Retrieved June 5, 2007, from 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/avian_influenza/en/index.html. 
  This WHO document provides an overview of avian influenza, including   
              discussion on its presence in birds and its history of human infection.  It also   
              provides a discussion on human epidemiology and symptoms.  Finally, it  
              identifies the nations currently affected by H5N1 infections.  This document  
              describes the potential of H5N1 to become the next influenza pandemic. 
Workforce Management Annotated Bibliography 
 76 
Annotated Bibliography (AB-01-07) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKFORCE MANAGEMENT AND PANDEMIC FLU 
PREPAREDNESS: 
ETHICAL ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
TO THE INDIANA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
August 2007 
 
 
 
Jennifer M. Alyea, B.S. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Workforce Management Annotated Bibliography 
 77 
The World Health Association and the 
World Health Organization have 
recognized the potential of an influenza 
pandemic and have called for member 
nations to start planning for the next 
pandemic, which WHO refers to as 
“‘inevitable, and possibly imminent.’”  
Some professionals have suggested 
preparing for a pandemic similar to the 
1918 “Spanish flu” that is estimated to 
have caused 50–100 million deaths.  It is 
projected that a similar pandemic would 
cause about 180–360 million deaths 
globally, including 1.7 million deaths in 
the United States, with transmission of 
the disease lasting at least two years.  If 
such a pandemic occurs, it will require 
drastic, though temporary, changes in 
many areas of society, including 
hospitals, schools, workplaces, and other 
public service organizations.  In 
planning a response for such a 
pandemic, many decisions will have to 
be made both to contain and control its 
spread, and policies to guide decision-
making will require consideration of 
ethical issues related to workforce 
management. 
 
Several references for this document 
were found via the Indiana University 
Center for Bioethics website’s pandemic 
resources page 
(http://bioethics.iupui.edu/Pandemic.html).  
Others were found through searches on 
the PubMed database 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez/), 
the World Health Organization’s website 
(http://www.who.int/en/), the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention website 
(http://www.cdc.gov), and the Yahoo! 
search engine using the terms “pandemic 
influenza,” “avian influenza,” 
“pandemic altered standards,” 
“pandemic triage,” “pandemic 
absenteeism,” “pandemic alternate care 
sites,” “pandemic altered care,” 
“pandemic workforce management,” 
“medical professional obligations,” 
“pandemic law,” “Indiana medical 
standards,” and “tuberculosis patient.” 
 
This document is not exhaustive of all 
possible resources regarding the topic of 
workforce management during a 
pandemic, but it is our hope that these 
resources may be of some use to those 
who are interested in pursuing the topic 
further.  This document is current as of 
July 16, 2007.
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              duties with the SARS epidemic in 2003.  Hsin and Macer argue that healthcare  
              workers should have the right to make their own choice about whether to report  
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   This is an Indiana law pertaining to the standards of practice set for various  
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   This document was created to assist nations on their development of pandemic  
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